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ABSTRACT
Ethereum has emerged as the most popular smart contract develop-
ment platform, with hundreds of thousands of contracts stored on
the blockchain and covering a variety of application scenarios, such
as auctions, trading platforms, and so on. Given their financial na-
ture, security vulnerabilities may lead to catastrophic consequences
and, even worse, they can be hardly fixed as data stored on the
blockchain, including the smart contract code itself, are immutable.
An automated security analysis of these contracts is thus of utmost
interest, but at the same time technically challenging for a variety
of reasons, such as the specific transaction-oriented programming
mechanisms, which feature a subtle semantics, and the fact that the
blockchain data which the contract under analysis interacts with,
including the code of callers and callees, are not statically known.
In this work, we present eThor , the first sound and automated
static analyzer for EVM bytecode, which is based on an abstraction
of the EVM bytecode semantics based on Horn clauses. In particular,
our static analysis supports reachability properties, which we show
to be sufficient for capturing interesting security properties for
smart contracts (e.g., single-entrancy) as well as contract-specific
functional properties. Our analysis is proven sound against a com-
plete semantics of EVM bytecode and an experimental large-scale
evaluation on real-world contracts demonstrates that eThor is practi-
cal and outperforms the state-of-the-art static analyzers: specifically,
eThor is the only one to provide soundness guarantees, terminates
on 95% of a representative set of real-world contracts, and achieves
an F -measure (which combines sensitivity and specificity) of 89%.
1 INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts introduced a radical paradigm shift in distributed
computation, promising security in an adversarial setting thanks
to the underlying consensus algorithm. Software developers can
implement sophisticated distributed, transaction-based computa-
tions by leveraging the scripting language offered by the underlying
blockchain technology. While many cryptocurrencies have an in-
tentionally limited scripting language (e.g., Bitcoin [41]), Ethereum
was designed from the ground up with a quasi Turing-complete
language1. Ethereum smart contracts have thus found a variety
of appealing use cases, such as auctions [27], data management
1While the language itself is Turing complete, computations are associated with a
bounded computational budget (called gas), which gets consumed by each instruction
thereby enforcing termination.
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systems [9], financial contracts [15], elections [40], trading plat-
forms [39, 43], permission management [13] and verifiable cloud
computing [20], just to mention a few. Given their financial nature,
bugs and vulnerabilities in smart contracts may lead to catastrophic
consequences. For instance, the infamous DAO vulnerability [1]
recently led to a 60M$ financial loss and similar vulnerabilities oc-
cur on a regular basis [2, 3]. Furthermore, many smart contracts in
the wild are intentionally fraudulent, as highlighted in a recent sur-
vey [12]. Even worse, due to the unmodifiable nature of blockchains,
bugs or vulnerabilities in deployed smart contracts cannot be fixed.
A rigorous security analysis of smart contracts is thus crucial for
the trust of the society in blockchain technologies and their wide-
spread deployment. Unfortunately, this task is quite challenging
for various reasons. First, Ethereum smart contracts are developed
in an ad-hoc language, called Solidity, which resembles JavaScript
but features non-standard semantic behaviours and transaction-
oriented mechanisms, which complicate smart contract develop-
ment and verification. Second, smart contracts are uploaded on
the blockchain in the form of Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
bytecode, a stack-based low-level code featuring very little static
information, which makes it extremely difficult to analyze. Finally,
most of the data available at runtime on the blockchain, including
the contracts which the contract under analysis may interact with,
may not be known statically, which requires ad-hoc abstraction
techniques. As a result, while effective bug finding tools for smart
contracts have been recently presented, there exists at present no
automated security analysis for EVM bytecode that provides formal se-
curity guarantees (i.e., absence of false negatives, as proven against
a formal semantics of EVM bytecode), as further detailed below.
1.1 State-of-the-art in Security Analysis of
Smart Contracts
Existing approaches to smart contract analysis can be mainly classi-
fied as interactive frameworks for semantic-based machine-checked
proofs [11, 14, 25, 29, 30, 49] and automated, heuristic-driven bug
finding tools [23, 35, 38, 42, 50].
Some recent works try to fill the middle ground between these
two approaches, aiming at the best of the two worlds, i.e., an au-
tomated, yet sound static analysis of Ethereum smart contracts
that can prove generic security properties [24, 34, 37, 48]. We con-
ducted a thorough investigation, finding out that all of them fail
to provide the intended soundness guarantees, which showcases
the difficulty of this task. In the following, we further expand on
this point, highlighting the particular challenges that occur in the
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process of designing a sound static analysis tool for Ethereum smart
contracts.
Semantic foundations. A first fundamental limitation of most
existing static analysis tools is that they do not establish a formal
connection with a semantic model of smart contract execution.
ZEUS [34] leverages existing symbolic model checking tools for
LLVM bitcode in order to analyze contracts written in Solidity. To
this end, ZEUS first translates Solidity code into an abstract inter-
mediate language and in a next step into LLVM bitcode. However,
upto now, there is no complete formal semantics of the Solidity
language, hence making it impossible to prove the performed trans-
lation to be semantics-preserving and consequently to derive formal
guarantees from the results of the LLVM model checking. This can
easily lead to flaws, as confirmed by the theoretical investigation
conducted in [24] as well as by empirical evidence provided in [47],
which contradict the original soundness claim [34]. [24] reviews a
theoretical approach to a static analysis technique based on Horn
clauses which is claimed to be provably sound, still we could find
sources of unsoundness in the presented abstraction as detailed in
§ D.4. Securify [48] is an abstract interpreter working at the level
of EVM bytecode that also aims to offer soundness guarantees: un-
fortunately, it does not come with any formal semantics or proof of
soundness, which leads to both false positives and false negatives,
as discussed below.
Formal security properties. As hinted in the previous paragraph,
for providing reliable guarantees, not only the analysis but also the
security properties have to be formalized in the underlying seman-
tic model. All reportedly sound tools do not accomplish that. While
for ZEUS the intended properties are just informally described, Se-
curify comes with an ad-hoc formalism for characterizing security
properties of smart contracts. This, however, is not related to a
formal EVM bytecode semantics, nor are the security patterns that
are used in the analysis to determine the fulfillment and violation of
these properties2 provably related to such formal characterization.
This omission results in the lack of soundness and completeness
guarantees, as we illustrate in § D.2 by providing counterexam-
ples for the majority of the proposed patterns. Similarly, the tool
NeuCheck [37] performs a purely syntactic analysis on Solidity
source code and defines security properties by syntactic patterns
on the smart contract’s syntax tree. These patterns cannot be related
to any semantic property due to a lacking formalism, and can be
shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for the corresponding
security properties, see § D.3.
Correct control flow reconstruction. Analyzing EVM bytecode
is particularly challenging as the underlying execution model al-
lows for dynamic jump destinations. Most works [10, 38, 44, 48]
reconstruct the control flow of a given smart contract before the
analysis. However, recovering jump destinations is interconnected
with the contract’s execution, and hence, performing such a sound
reconstruction is not trivial. For instance, [48] uses a custom algo-
rithm – whose correctness is never discussed – for doing so. Indeed
2[48] introduces compliance and violation patterns for security properties where a
contract matching a compliance pattern is meant to satisfy the property and a contract
matching a violation pattern to violate it.
we found an example showing that this algorithm yields unsound
results(see § D.1), undermining the soundness of the analysis.
Practicality. A useful, automated analysis tool needs to be per-
formant, not only in terms of overall execution time, but also in
terms of precision. This is particularly challenging as the soundness
goal prevents the use of (potentially cheap and fast) heuristics to
guide the analysis, but instead requires the chosen abstractions to
provably over-approximate the set of all possible executions. Ap-
propriate abstractions hence need to be sound, but still efficiently
encodable and precise enough to account for a contract’s safety.
Benchmarking, testing, and community validation. The previous
problems which affect the design of reliable analysis tools are ag-
gravated by the fact that there is no reliable and comparable bench-
marking or testing infrastructure for Ethereum smart contract anal-
ysis tools. One reason for that is the lack of clear definitions for the
generic security properties targeted by the analysis tools in the first
place. Another explanation is the difficulty of manually investigat-
ing the bytecode of real-world contracts for assessing their ground
truth. Even though the existing works evaluate their performance
on real world smart contracts (fetched from the blockchain), the
used ground truth is spurious: While [48] reports quality metrics
only on a dataset of 100 contracts which are not made available, [34]
presents results on a dataset encompassing over 1500 contracts from
the blockchain. When manually investigating this dataset, however,
we found several issues ranging from non-existing contracts to
deviating ground truths. These problems are detailed in § 5.
Inspired by the issues that we see in the state of the art, we
introduce a principled approach to the design and implementation
of a sound, yet performant, static analysis tool for EVM bytecode.
1.2 Our Contributions
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We design the first provably sound static analyzer for EVM
bytecode, which builds on top of a reachability analysis real-
ized by Horn clause resolution. We show that a reachability
analysis suffices to verify various interesting security proper-
ties for smart contracts as well as contract-specific functional
properties via an encoding into Hoare-style reasoning. The
design of such static analysis is technically challenging, since
it requires careful abstractions of various EVM components
(e.g., the stack-based execution model, the gas used to bound
the smart contract execution, and the memory model) as
well as a dedicated over-approximation of the data stored
on the blockchain, which is not statically known and yet the
contract under analysis can interact with (e.g., the code of
other contracts which may act both as callers and callees);
• We prove the soundness of our static analysis technique
against the semantics of EVM bytecode formalized by Gr-
ishchenko et al. [25];
• In order to facilitate future refinements of our analysis, as
well as the design of similar static analyses for other lan-
guages, we design and implementHoRSt, a framework for the
specification and implementation of static analyses based on
Horn clause resolution. Specifically, HoRSt takes as input a
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(pen-and-paper like) specification of the Horn clauses defin-
ing the static analysis and produces a smt-lib [8] encoding
suitable for z3 [31], which includes various optimizations
such as Horn clause and constant folding;
• We useHoRSt to implement the static analyzer eThor . To gain
confidence in the resulting implementation, we encode the
relevant semantic tests (604 in total) of the official EVM suite
as reachability properties, against which we successfully test
the soundness and precision of eThor ;
• We conduct a large-scale experimental evaluation on real-
world contract data comparing eThor to the state-of-the-art
analyzer ZEUS [34] which claims to provide soundness guar-
antees. While ZEUS shows a remarkable specificity (i.e., com-
pleteness) of 99.8%, eThor clearly outperforms ZEUS in terms
of recall (i.e., soundness) – 100% vs. 11.4% – which empiri-
cally refutes ZEUS’ soundness claim. With a specificity of
80%, eThor results in an overall performance of 88.9% (ac-
cording to the F-measure) as compared to ZEUS’ F-measure
of 20.4%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. § 2 reviews
Ethereum and the semantics of EVM bytecode. § 3 introduces our
static reachability analysis, specifies its soundness guarantee and
discusses relevant smart contract properties in scope of the analy-
sis. § 4 introduces the specification language HoRSt. § 5 describes
eThor and presents our experimental evaluation. § 7 concludes by
discussing interesting future research directions. The appendix pro-
vides proofs and additional material. The source code of eThor and
HoRSt with the dataset used in the experimental evaluation are
available online [6].
2 ETHEREUM
We first introduce the required background on Ethereum (§ 2.1)
and then overview an existing semantics of EVM bytecode (§ 2.2),
which this work builds on.
2.1 Background
The Ethereum platform can be seen as a transaction-based state
machine where transactions alter the global state of the system,
which consists of accounts. There are two types of accounts: Ex-
ternal accounts, which are owned by a user of the system, and
contract accounts, which can be seen as a distributed program. All
accounts hold a balance in the virtual currency Ether. Additionally,
contract accounts include persistent storage and the contract’s code.
Transactions can either create new contract accounts or call exist-
ing accounts. Calls to external accounts can only transfer Ether to
this account, but calls to contract accounts additionally execute the
account’s contract code. The contract execution might influence the
storage of the account and might as well perform new transactions
– in this case, we speak of internal transactions. The effects of con-
tract executions are determined by the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). This virtual machine characterizes the quasi Turing complete
execution model of Ethereum smart contracts where the otherwise
Turing complete execution is restricted by an upfront defined re-
source gas that effectively limits the number of execution steps. A
transaction’s originator can specify an upper bound on the gas that
she is willing to pay for the contract execution and also sets the gas
Callstacks S := EXC ::U | HALT(σ , gas, d, η) ::U | U
Plain callstacks U := (µ, ι, σ , η) ::U | ϵ
Machine states µ := (gas, pc,m, i, s)
Account states a := (n, b, code, stor)
Figure 1: Grammar for calls stacks
price (the amount of Ether to pay for a unit of gas). The originator
then prepays the specified gas limit and gets refunded according to
the remaining gas in case of successful contract execution.
EVM bytecode. Contracts are published on the blockchain in
form of EVM bytecode– an Assembler like bytecode language. The
EVM is a stack-based machine and specifies the semantics of byte-
code instructions. Consequently, EVM bytecode mainly consists of
standard instructions for stack operations, arithmetics, jumps and
local memory access. The instruction set is complemented with
blockchain-specific instructions such as an opcode for the SHA3
hash and several opcodes for accessing information on the current
(internal) transaction. In addition, there are opcodes for accessing
and modifying the storage of the executing account and distinct
opcodes for initiating internal transactions.
Each instruction is associated with (a potentially environment-
dependent) gas cost. If the up-front defined gas-limit is exceeded
during execution, the transaction execution halts exceptionally and
the effects of the current transaction on the global state are reverted.
For nested transactions, an exception only reverts the effects of the
executing transaction, but not those of the calling transactions.
Solidity. In practice, Ethereum smart contracts are shipped and exe-
cuted in EVMbytecode format but are, for a large part, written in the
high-level language Solidity, which is developed by the Ethereum
Foundation [5]. The syntax of Solidity resembles JavaScript, en-
riched with additional primitives accounting for the distributed
setting of Ethereum. Solidity exhibits specific features that give rise
to smart contract vulnerabilities, as will be in discussed in § 2.3. We
will not give a full account of Solidity’s language features here, but
add explanations throughout the paper when needed.
2.2 EVM Semantics
Our static analysis targets a recently introduced small-step seman-
tics for EVM bytecode [25], which we shortly review below.3
The semantics of EVM bytecode is given by a small-step relation
Γ ⊨ S → S ′ that encompasses the possible steps that a callstack
S , representing the overall state of a contract execution, can make
under the transaction environment Γ. The transaction environment
Γ summarizes static information about the transaction execution
such as the information on the block that the transaction is part
of and transaction-specific information such as gas price or limit.
We write Γ ⊨ S →∗ S ′ for the reflexive transitive closure of the
small-step relation and call the pair (Γ, S) a configuration.
Configurations. The most important formal components of EVM
configurations are summarized in Figure 1.
3More recent changes to the EVM semantics such as the introduction of STATICCALL,
CREATE, and CREATE2, are not explicitly mentioned in this paper, but covered by our
static analysis as specified in [6].
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Global State. Ethereum’s global state σ is formally captured as
a (partial) mapping from account addresses to account states. An
account state consists of a nonce n that is incremented with every
other account that the account creates, a balance b, a persistent
storage stor, and the account’s code. External accounts have no code
and hence cannot access storage.
Callstacks. The overall state of an external transaction is cap-
tured by a stack of execution states that we will refer to as callstack.
The individual execution states reflect the states of the pending
internal transactions. More formally, the elements of a callstack are
either regular execution states of the form (µ, ι,σ ,η) or terminal
execution states HALT(σ , gas,d,η) and EXC which can only occur
as stack top elements. For terminated executions we differentiate
between exceptional halting (EXC), which will revert all effects of
the transaction, and regular halting HALT(σ , gas,d,η), in which
case the effects of the transaction are captured by the global state
σ at the point of halting, the gas remaining from the execution, the
return data d , and the transaction effects η (effects that will only be
applied after completing the external execution).
The state of a non-terminated internal transaction is described
by a regular execution state of the form (µ, ι,σ ,η). During execu-
tion, this state tracks the current global state σ of the system, the
execution environment ι to the internal transaction (which specifies
parameters such as the input to the transaction and the code to be
executed) as well as the local state µ of the stack machine, and the
transaction effects η that will be applied after transaction execution.
The local machine state µ reflects the state of the stack ma-
chine that handles local computations. It is represented by a tuple
(gas, pc,m, i, s) holding the amount of gas available for execution,
the program counter pc, the local memory m, the number of active
words in memory i, and the machine stack s. As the stack machine
models local computations, the execution of every new (internal)
transaction starts again in a fresh machine state at program counter
zero with an empty stack and zero-initialized memory. Only the gas
value is initialized as specified by the initiator of the transaction.
Small-step Rules.We illustrate the mechanics of the EVM byte-
code semantics by an example and refer to [25] for a full definition.
Local instructions, e.g., ADD, only operate on the machine state:
ι .code [µ .pc] = ADD µ .s = a :: b :: s
µ .gas ≥ 3 µ′ = µ[s → (a + b) :: s][pc += 1][gas −= 3]
Γ ⊨ (µ, ι, σ , η) :: S → (µ′, ι, σ , η) :: S
Given a stack that contains at least two values and given a sufficient
amount of gas (here 3 units), an ADD instruction takes two values
from the stack and pushes their sum. These effects, as well as the
advancement in the program counter and the substraction of the
gas cost, are reflected in the updated machine state µ ′.
A more evolved semantics is exhibited by the class of transaction
initiating instructions (CALL, CALLCODE and DELEGATECALL,
CREATE). Intuitively, CALL executes the callee’s code in its own
environment, CALLCODE executes the callee’s code in the caller’s
environment, which might be useful to call libraries implemented
in a separate contract, and DELEGATECALL takes a step further
by preserving not only the caller’s environment but even part of
the environment of the previous call (e.g., the sender information),
which effectively treats the callee’s code as an internal function
of the caller’s code. Finally, the CREATE instruction initiates an
internal transaction that creates a new account.
Instructions from this set are particularly difficult to analyze,
since their arguments are dynamically evaluated and the execution
environment has to be tracked and properly modified across dif-
ferent calls. Furthermore, it can well be that the code of a called
function is not accessible at analysis time, e.g., because the contract
allows for money transfers to a dynamic set of contracts (like in
the DAO contract as will be discussed in the next section).
2.3 Security Properties of Smart Contracts
Ethereum smart contracts have undergone several severe attacks in
the past that where enabled bymajor bugs in the contract code, most
prominently the DAO hack [1]. Interestingly, this bug can be traced
back to the violation of a generic security property of the attacked
contract, called single-entrancy. We will shortly present the class
of reentrancy attacks and the corresponding security property.
Preliminary Notions. In order to present security properties in a
concise fashion, the previously presented small-step semantics is
augmented with an annotation to callstack elements that reflects
the currently executed contract. We say that an execution state s
is strongly consistent with annotation c if s executes c (according
to the execution environment) and c is present in the global state
of s . Further, for arguing about EVM bytecode executions, we are
only interested in those initial configurations that might result
from a valid external transaction in a valid block. We call these
configurations reachable and refer to [25] for a detailed definition.
Single-entrancy. For motivating the definition of single-entrancy,
we introduce a class of bugs in Ethereum smart contracts called
reentrancy bugs [12, 38]. Reentrancy attacks exploit that a contract
which hands over control to another contract by calling it can
be called back (reentered) before completing the original internal
transaction. At the point of reentering the contract can then be in
an inconsistent state which allows for unintended behavior. In the
DAO hack, the attacker stole all funds of the contract by reentering
the contract and sending money to itself. We exemplify this kind of
attack by the Bank contract in Figure 2: this has a basic reentrancy
protection in place which however can easily be circumvented.
The Bank contract implements a simple banking functionality,
keeping the balance of all users (identified by their addresses) in
the mapping bal. We only discuss the contract function drain which
allows a user to transfer all its money from its bank account to the
provided beneficiary address a. For protecting against reentrancy,
the drain function implements a simple locking functionality: it is
only entered in case the lock is not taken . Otherwise it takes the lock
(using function take), transfers the remaining balance of the function
callee (denoted by msg.sender) to the beneficiary address a, updates the
user’s balance, and releases the lock again. One needs to note that
the call construct (being translated to a CALL instruction in EVM
bytecode) does not only trigger the value transfer, but also invokes
the execution of the callee’s so-called fallback function (written as
a function without name or argument in Solidity as depicted in the
Mallory contract in Figure 2). Hence, the use of a call can cause the
the executed contract to be reentered during execution, potentially
undermining the contract integrity. The locking mechanism should
prevent this problem by causing an exception in case the contract
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Figure 2: Reentrancy Attack.
is reentered (indicated by the lock being taken). However, since the
locking functionality is publicly accessible, a reentrancy attack (as
depicted in Figure 2) is still possible: An attacker calling the drain
function (via Mallory) with Mallory’s address as argument ( 1 ) transfers
all of Mallory’s money back to her and executes her fallback function
( 2 ). Mallory then first calls the public release function to release the
lock ( 3 ) and next calls the drain function of Bank again ( 4 ). Since the
attacker’s balance has not been updated yet at this point, another
transfer of the prior amount to Mallory can be performed ( 5 ). These
steps can be continued until running out of gas or reaching the
callstack limit. In both cases the last value transfer is rolled back,
but the effects of all former internal transactions persist, leaving
the contract Bank drained-out.
The security property ruling out these attacks is called single-
entrancy and is formalized below. Intuitively, a contract is single-
entrant if it cannot perform any more calls after reentering.
Definition 2.1 (Single-entrancy [25]). A contract c is single-entrant
if for all reachable configurations (Γ, sc :: S), for all s ′, s ′′, S ′
Γ ⊨ sc :: S →∗ s′c :: S ′ + sc :: S
=⇒ ¬∃s′′, c′. Γ ⊨ s′c :: S ′ + sc :: S →∗ s′′c′ :: s′c :: S ′ + sc :: S
where + denotes concatenation of callstacks. The property ex-
presses that after reentering a contract c (in state s ′c ) while executing
a call initiated by the very same contract, it is not possible any-
more to perform another internal transaction (which would result
in adding another element s ′′c ′ to the call stack). Note that the call
stack records the sequence of calling states, hence the suffix sc :: S
indicates a pending call initiated by the execution s of contract c .
Single-entrancy is particularly interesting in that it constitutes a
generic robustness property of smart contracts. In contrast, other
prominent vulnerabilities [2, 3] are caused by functional correct-
ness issues that are particular to a specific contract. For spotting
such issues, contract-specific correctness properties need to be de-
fined and verified. We discuss the formalization of such properties
in § 3.5.
3 STATIC ANALYSIS OF EVM BYTECODE
Starting from the small-step semantics presented in § 2.2, we design
a sound reachability analysis that supports (among others) the vali-
dation of the single-entrancy property. We follow the verification
chain depicted in Figure 3: For showing the executions of a contract
to satisfy some property Φ, we formulate a Horn-clause based ab-
straction that abstracts the contract execution behavior and argue
about an abstracted property over abstract executions instead. This
reasoning is sound given that all concrete small-step executions are
?
Small-step Semantics
Abstract Semantics
concrete execution
abstract execution
∀
∃
...
...
Soundness
Λ
Λ
≤
𝛼
𝛼
bad concrete
states
Reachability Property
Reachability Query
bad abstract
states
∀
∀
Soundness
𝛼
≤
⇒ =
contract execution 
behavior property abstraction
𝛼 𝛼 𝛼 𝛼 𝛼
≤
≤ ≤ ≤
Λ
Λ Λ Λ
Λ
Λ
Λ Λ Λ
Λ Λ
Φ⊨
?
...Λ Λ
Figure 3: Formal verification chain of eThor. ∆ ⊢Λ ∆′ denotes
that the abstract configuration ∆′ can be logically derived from ∆′
(within one step) using the Horn clauses in Λ.
modeled by some abstract execution and given that the abstracted
property over-approximates Φ.
A Horn-clause based abstraction for a small-step semantics→
is characterized by an abstraction function α that translates con-
crete configurations (here ) into abstract configurations (here ).
Abstract configurations are sets of predicate applications where
predicates (formally characterized by their signature S) range over
the values from abstract domains. These abstract arguments are
equipped with an order ≤ that can be canonically lifted to pred-
icates and further to abstract configurations, hence establishing
a notion of precision on the latter. Intuitively, α translates a con-
crete configuration into its most precise abstraction. The abstract
semantics is specified by a set of Constrained Horn clauses Λ over
the predicates from S and describes how abstract configurations
evolve during abstract execution. A Constrained Horn clause is a
logical implication that can be interpreted as an inference rule for
a predicate, consequently an abstract execution consists of logical
derivations from an abstract configuration using Λ. A Horn-clause
based abstraction constitutes a sound approximation of small-step
semantics→ if every concrete (multi-step) execution →∗ ′ can
be simulated by an abstract execution: More precisely, from the
abstract configuration α( ) one can logically derive using Λ an
abstract configuration that constitutes an over-approximation of
′ (so is at least as abstract as α( ′)). A formal presentation of the
soundness statement is given in § 3.4 while a characterization in
abstract interpretation terminology is deferred to § B.1. A sound ab-
straction allows for the provable analysis of reachability properties:
Such properties can be expressed as sets of problematic configu-
rations (here ). Correspondingly, a sound abstraction for such a
property is a set of bad abstract configurations (here ) which con-
tains all possible over-approximations of the bad concrete states.
The soundness of the abstract semantics then guarantees that if no
bad abstract configuration from this set can be entered, also no bad
configuration can be reached in the concrete execution.
3.1 Main Abstractions
Our analysis abstracts from several details of the original small-step
semantics. In the following we overview the main abstractions:
Blockchain environment. The analysis describes the invocation of a
contract (in the following denoted as c∗) in an arbitrary blockchain
environment, hence is not modeling the execution environment as
5
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Sc∗ ∋ p :=
| MStatepc : (N × (N→ Dˆ)) × (N→ Dˆ) × (N→ Dˆ) × B→ B
| Exc : B→ B
| Halt : (N→ Dˆ) × B→ B
pc ∈ {0, . . . , |c∗ .code | − 1}
Dˆ := N ∪ {⊤}
Figure 4: Definition of the predicate signature Sc∗ and the
abstract domain Dˆ.
well as large fractions of the global state. Indeed, most of this infor-
mation is not statically known as the state of the blockchain at con-
tract execution cannot be reliably predicted. As a consequence, the
analysis has to deal with a high number of unknown environment
inputs in the abstract semantics. Most prominently, the behavior
of other contracts needs to be appropriately over-approximated,
which turns out to be particularly challenging since such contracts
can interact with c∗ in multitudinous ways.
Gas modelling. The contract gas consumption is not modeled. The
gas resource, which is meant to bound the contract execution, is
set by the transaction initiator and hence not necessarily known
at analysis time. For this reason, our analysis takes into account
that a contract execution might exceptionally halt at any point due
to an out-of-gas exception, which does not affect the precision of
the analysis for security properties that consider arbitrary contract
invocations (and hence arbitrary gas limits).
Memory model. In the EVM the local memory is byte-indexed, while
the machine stack holds words (encompassing 32 bytes). Conse-
quently loading a machine word from memory requires to assemble
the byte values from 32 consecutive memory cells. However, as al-
ready described in [45], in practice reasoning about this conversion
between words and bytes is hard. Therefore, we model memory in
our abstraction as a word array: this enables very cheap accesses in
case that memory is accessed at the start of a new memory word,
and otherwise just requires the combination of two memory words.
Callstack. The callstack is captured by a two-level abstraction distin-
guishing only between the original execution of c∗ (call level 0) and
reentrancies of c∗ ultimately originating from the original execu-
tion (call level 1). This abstraction reflects that given the unknown
blockchain environment, the state of the callstack when reenter-
ing is obscure: it is unknown who initiated the reentering call and
which other internal transactions have been executed before.
3.2 Analysis Definition
In the following we formally specify our analysis by defining the
underlying Horn-clause based abstraction. An abstract configura-
tion is a set of predicate applications representing one or several
concrete configurations. Since we are interested in analyzing exe-
cutions of the contract c∗, we consider EVM configurations repre-
senting such executions, which are call stacks having an execution
state of contract c∗ as a bottom element. We abstract such a call
stack by the set of all its elements that describe executions of c∗,
reflecting the stack structure only by indicating whether a relevant
execution state represents the original execution of c∗ (call level
0) or a reentering execution that hence appears higher on the call
stack (call level 1). The individual execution states are abstracted
as predicate applications using the predicates listed in Figure 4:
A predicate application of the form MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ)
describes a regular execution of c∗ at program counter pc that has
a local stack of size size with elements as described by the mapping
s (from stack positions to elements) and a local memory m, and
the global storage of contract c∗ at this point being stor. Accord-
ingly, the predicate application Exc(cℓ) denotes that an execution
of c∗ exceptionally halted on call level cℓ and Halt(stor, cℓ) repre-
sents an execution that halted regularly on call level cℓ with the
global storage of c∗ being stor. Since during the abstract execution,
a precise modeling of all the described state components is not al-
ways possible, the argument domains of the predicates encompass
the abstract domain Dˆ that enriches N with the join element ⊤
over-approximating any natural number. Formally, the described
abstractions of EVM configurations are captured by the abstraction
function α in Figure 5 that maps call stacks into the corresponding
sets of predicates, yielding an abstract configuration.
Note that α is parametrized by c∗ and that only the callstack
elements modeling executions of c∗ are translated. The transitions
between abstract configurations (as yielded by α ) are described by
an abstract semantics in the form of Constrained Horn clauses. The
abstract semantics is also specific to the contract c∗: Depending on
the EVM instructions that appear in c∗, it contains Horn clauses
that over-approximate the execution steps enabled by the corre-
sponding instructions. We hence formulate the abstract semantics
as a function δ that maps a contract c∗ to the union over the Horn
clauses that model the individual instructions in the contract:
δ (c∗) :=
⋃
0≤i< |c∗ .code|
Lc∗ .code[i]Mi
The core of the abstract semantics is defined by the instruction
abstraction function L·Mi that maps a contract instruction at position
i to a set of Horn clauses over-approximating the semantics of
the corresponding instruction. We will discuss the translation of
the ADD, MLOAD, and CALL instruction depicted in Figure 6 to
illustrate the main features of the abstract semantics.
Addition. The abstract semantics of the addition instruction (ADD)
encompasses two Horn clauses describing the successful execution
and the failure case. A prerequisite for a successful addition is the
existence of a sufficient amount of arguments on the machine stack.
In this case, the top stack values are extracted and the stack at the
next program counter (modeled by the predicate MStatepc+1) is
updated with their sum. As the stack elements, however, range over
the abstract value domain Dˆ, the addition operation on N needs
to be lifted to Dˆ: Following the general intuition of ⊤ represent-
ing all potential values in N, the occurrence of ⊤ as one of the
operands immediately declassifies the result to ⊤. Similar liftings
are performed for all unary, binary and comparison operators in
the instruction set. A precise definition is given in § B.2.
In accordance to the choice of not modeling gas consumption,
the Horn clause modeling, the failure case – which is common
to the abstract semantics of all instructions – does not have any
preconditions, but the instruction reachability. This rule subsumes
all other possible failure cases (such as stack over- and underflows).
Memory Access. Memory access on the level of EVM bytecode is
enabled by theMLOAD instruction which takes the memory offset
to be accessed as argument from the stack and pushes instead the
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αc∗ (S ) :=

∅ S = ϵ
αs (s, c∗ .addr, cℓ) ∪ αc∗ (S ′) S = sc∗ :: S ′ ∧ cℓ = (S ′ = ϵ ) ? 0 : 1
αc∗ (S ′) S = sc :: S ′ ∧ c , c∗
αs (s, a, cℓ) :=

{MStatepc(( |s |, stackToArray(s)), toWordMem(m), σ (a).stor, cℓ)} s = ((gas, pc, m, i, s), ι, σ , η)
{Exc(cℓ)} s = EXC
{Halt(σ (a).stor, cℓ)} s = HALT(σ , gas, data, η)
∅ otherwise
stackToArray(s) :=
{
λx . 0 s = ϵ
(stackToArray(s′))|s′ |x s = x :: s′
toWordMem(m) := λx .m[x · 32] | |1m[x · 32 + 1] · · · | |1m[x · 32 + 31]
Figure 5: Configuration abstraction function. Here v | |nw denotes the value obtained by concatenating v’s andw ’s byte representation,
assuming thatw is represented by n bytes.
LADDMpc := {MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 1 ∧ xˆ = s[size − 1] ∧ yˆ = s[size − 2]
=⇒ MStatepc+1((size − 1, s[size − 2 → xˆ +̂ yˆ]),m, stor, cℓ), (A1)
MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) =⇒ Exc(cℓ) } (A2)LMLOADMpc := {MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 1 ∧ oˆ = s[size − 1] ∧ vˆ = (oˆ ∈ N) ? getWord(m, oˆ) : ⊤
=⇒ MStatepc+1((size, s[size − 1 → vˆ]),m, stor, cℓ), . . . } (M1)LCALLMpc := {MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 6 =⇒ MStatepc+1((size − 6, s[size − 7 → ⊤]), λx .⊤, λx .⊤, cℓ), (C1)
MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 6 =⇒ MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0, stor, 1), (C2)
MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 6 ∧ Halt(storh, 1) =⇒ MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0, storh, 1), . . .} (C3)
Figure 6: Partial definition of L·Mpc: selection of abstract semantics rules. ForMLOAD and CALL the exception rule is omitted.
word from the memory starting at this index. In our abstraction
defined by the abstract semantic rule depicted in Figure 6 either
immediately ⊤ is pushed to the stack (in case that the offset oˆ
is not a concrete value and hence the value to be loaded cannot
be determined) or the word from the concrete memory offset is
extracted. The extraction needs to account for the word-indexed
memory abstraction that we chose and is formally defined by the
function getWord(·, ·) depicted in Figure 7. In case that the offset is
a word address (divisible by 32), the corresponding value can be
accessed from the word memorym by converting the byte address
to the word address ( p32 ). Otherwise, the word at the next lower
word address (⌊ p32 ⌋) and the word at the next higher byte address
(⌈ p32 ⌉) are accessed to combine their relevant parts to a full word.
Contract Calls. The abstraction for CALL is the most interesting.
This instruction takes seven arguments from the stack that specify
parameters to the call such as the target of the call or the value
to be transferred along with the memory addresses specifying the
location of the input and the return data. When returning from
a successful contract call, the value 1 is written to the stack and
the return value is written to the specified memory fragment. The
persistent storage after a successful call contains all changes that
were performed during the execution of the called contract. In the
case that the contract call terminated exceptionally instead, the
storage is rolled back to the point of calling and the value 0 is
written to the stack to indicate failure.
Since a contract CALL initiates the execution of another (un-
known) contract, all its effects on the executions of c∗ need to be
modeled. More precisely, these effects are two-fold: the resuming
execution of c∗ on the current call level needs to be approximated,
as well as the reentering executions of c∗ (on a higher call level). For
obtaining an analysis that is precise enough to detect real-world
contracts with reentrancy protection as secure, it is crucial to model
c∗’s persistent storage as accurately as possible in reentering execu-
tions. This makes it necessary to carefully study how the storage at
the point of reentering relates to the one in the previous executions
of c∗, taking into account that (in the absence of DELEGATECALL
and CALLCODE instructions in c∗) only c∗ can manipulate its own
storage. Figure 8 overviews the storage propagation in the case
of a contract call: To this end it shows the sequence diagram of a
concrete execution of c∗ that calls a contract c ′ which again trig-
gers several reentrancies of c∗. In this course three ways of storage
propagation between executions of c∗ are exhibited: 1) The storage
is forward propagated from a calling execution to a reentering exe-
cution of c∗ ( A , C ) 2) The storage is cross propagated from a finished
reentering execution to another reentering execution of c∗ ( B ) 3)
The storage is back propagated from a finished reentering execution
to a calling execution of c∗ ( D , E ) These three kinds of propagation
are reflected in the three abstract rules for the call instruction given
in Figure 6 and correspondingly visualized in Figure 8.
Rule (C1) describes how the execution of c∗ (original and reenter-
ing alike) resumes after returning from the call, and hence approxi-
mates storage back propagation: For the sake of simplicity, storage
gets over-approximated in this case by λx .⊤. The same applies to
the local memory and stack top value since those are affected by
the result of the computation of the unknown contract. Rule (C2)
captures the initiation of a reentering execution (at call level 1) with
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getWord(m, p) :=
{
m[ p32 ] p mod 32 = 0
(m[⌊ p32 ⌋][p mod 32,31]) | |p (m[⌈ p32 ⌉][0, (p mod 32)−1]) otherwise
Figure 7: Function extracting the word at byte offset p from word-indexed memorym. Here v[l,r ] denotes the value represented by
v’s lth byte till r th byte in big endian byte representation. v | |nw is defined as in Figure 5. We assume both operations to be lifted to Dˆ.
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Figure 8: Illustration of the different call abstractions.
storage forward propagation: As contract execution always starts
at program counter 0 with empty stack and zeroed-out local mem-
ory, only abstractions (instances of theMState0 predicate) of this
shape are implied. The forward propagation of storage is modeled
by initializing the MState0 predicate with the storage stor at call
time. Rule (C3) models storage cross propagation: Similar to rule
(C2), an abstract reentering execution in a fresh machine state is
triggered. However, the storage is not propagated from the point of
calling, but from another finished reentering execution whose re-
sults are abstracted by the halting predicateHalt at call level 1. This
rule is independent of the callee in that it is only conditioned on
the reachability of some CALL instruction, but it does not depend
on any of the callee’s state. Instead its cyclic structure requires to
extrapolate an invariant on the potential storage modifications that
are computable by c∗: Intuitively, when reentering c∗ it needs to
be considered that priorly the storage was modified by applying
an arbitrary sequence of c∗’s public functions. The significance
of this abstraction is motivated by the example in Figure 2 where
the attack is only enabled by calling Bank’s release function first, to
release the lock before reentering.
3.3 Scope of the analysis
Before presenting the soundness result, we discuss the scope of
the analysis. The analysis targets contracts in a stand-alone setting,
which means that the behavior of all contracts that c∗ might in-
teract with is over-approximated. This abstraction is not merely a
design choice, but rather a necessity as the state of the blockchain
(including the code of the contracts residing there) at execution
time cannot be statically determined. Still, we could easily accom-
modate the precise analysis of a set of known contracts e.g., library
contracts that are already present on the blockchain. We omitted
this straightforward extension in this work for the sake of clarity
and succinctness in the analysis definition and the soundness claim.
Following this line of argumentation, we assume c∗ not to contain
DELEGATECALL and CALLCODE instructions: these instructions
enable the execution of another contract code in the context of c∗,
allowing for the modification of the persistent storage of c∗ and
even of money transfers on behalf of c∗. Using DELEGATECALL
or CALLCODE to call an unknown contract can therefore poten-
tially result in the reachability of any execution states of contract
c∗. Consequently every property relying on the non-reachability
of certain problematic contract states would be considered vio-
lated. In a setting of multiple known contracts the restriction on
DELEGATECALL and CALLCODE instructions could be relaxed to
allow for such calls that are guaranteed to target known contracts.
We now briefly illustrate the key design choices behind our ab-
straction, which we carefully crafted to find the sweet spot between
accuracy and practicality. The analysis is value sensitive in that
concrete stack, memory, and storage values are tracked until they
get abstracted due to influence of unknown components. For lo-
cal computations, the analysis is partly flow-sensitive (considering
the order of instructions, but merging abstract configurations at
the same program counters) and path-sensitive (being sensitive to
branch conditions). On the level of contract calls, a partial context
sensitivity is given in that the storage at the time of calling influ-
ences the analysis of the subsequent call, but no other inputs to
the call are tracked. In particular (due to the lack of knowledge on
interactions with other contracts) all reentering calls are merged
into a single abstraction, accumulating all possible storage states
at the point of reentering. For this reason, the analysis of calls on
level 1 is less precise than the one of the original execution on call
level 0, where only the restrictions of flow sensitivity apply.
3.4 Soundness Result
We prove, for each contract c∗, that the defined Horn-clause based
abstraction soundly over-approximates the small-step semantics
presented in § 2.2. Formally, this property is stated as follows:
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness). Let c∗ be a contract whose code does
not contain DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE. Let Γ be a transaction
environment and let S and S ′ be annotated callstacks such that |S ′ | >
0. Then for all execution states s that are strongly consistent with c∗
it holds that
Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →∗ S ′ + S =⇒ ∀∆I . αc∗ ([sc∗ ]) ≤ ∆I
=⇒ ∃∆. ∆I , δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆ ∧ αc∗ (S ′) ≤ ∆
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The theorem states that every execution of contract c∗ (modeled
by a multi-step execution starting in state sc∗ on an arbitrary call
stack S and ending in call stack S ′ + S , indicating that the original
execution of c∗ yielded the state as modeled by the call stack S ′),
can be mimicked by an abstract execution. This means that from
every abstract configuration ∆I that abstracts sc∗ (so that it is more
abstract than α([sc∗ ])) one can logically derive using the Horn
clauses in δ (c∗) some abstract configuration ∆ abstracting S ′. As a
consequence of this theorem we can soundly reason about arbitrary
executions of a contract c∗: if we can show that from an abstract
configuration ∆I , that abstracts a set of initial execution states
of c∗, it is impossible to derive using δ (c∗) some other abstract
configuration ∆, that abstracts a set of problematic execution states
of c∗, then this ensures that all these problematic states are not
reachable with a small-step execution from any of the initial states.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 we refer the reader to § B.
3.5 Reachability Properties for Contract Safety
As characterized by the soundness result, our abstraction allows
for the sound analysis of reachability properties. We will illustrate
in the following how such a reachability analysis is sufficient to
express relevant smart contract security properties.
Single-entrancy. Some generic security properties of Ethereum
smart contracts can be over-approximated by reachability proper-
ties and hence checked automatically by our static analysis. Con-
sider, the single-entrancy property from § 2.3 which has been
proven to be approximated by the following reachability property
in [24].
Definition 3.2 (Call unreachability [24]). A contract c is call un-
reachable if for all regular execution states (µ, ι,σ ,η) that are strongly
consistent with c and satisfy µ = (д, 0, λx . 0, 0, ϵ) for some д ∈ N, it
holds that for all transaction environments Γ and all callstacks S
¬∃s, S . Γ ⊨ (µ, ι, σ , η)c :: S →∗ sc :: S ′ + S
∧ |S ′ | > 0 ∧ code (c) [s .µ .pc] ∈ Instcall
Where the set Instcall of call instructions is defined as
Instcall = {CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL, CREATE}
Intuitively, call reachability is a valid over-approximation of
single-entrancy as an internal transaction can only be initiated by
the execution of a call instruction. Consequently, for excluding
that an internal transaction was initiated after reentering, it is
sufficient to ensure that no call instruction is reachable at this point.
In addition, as all contracts start their executions in a fresh machine
state (program counter and active words set to 0, empty stack,
memory initialized to 0) when being initially called, it is sufficient
to check all executions of contract c that started in such a state.
Static assertion checking. The Solidity language supports the
insertion of assertions into source code. Assertions shall function
as pure sanity checks for developers and are enforced at runtime
by the compiler creating the corresponding checks on the bytecode
level and throwing an exception (using the INVALID opcode) in
case of an assertion violation [21]. However, adding these additional
checks creates a two-fold cost overhead: At create time a longer
bytecode needs to be deployed (the longer the bytecode the higher
the gas cost for creation) and at call time the additional checks need
to be executed which results in additional gas consumption. With
our static analysis technique, assertions can be statically checked
by querying for the reachability of the INVALID instructions. If no
such instruction is reachable, by the soundness of the analysis, the
code is proven to give the same guarantees as with the assertion
checks (up to gas) and those checks can safely be removed from the
code resulting in shorter and cheaper contracts.4 Formally, we can
characterize this property as the following reachability property:
Definition 3.3 (Static assertion checking). Let c be a contract and
(µ, ι,σ ,η) regular execution states such that (µ, ι,σ ,η) is strongly
consistent with c and µ = (д, 0, λx . 0, 0, ϵ) for some д ∈ N. Let Γ be
an arbitrary transaction environment and S be an arbitrary callstack.
Then a the static assertion check for c is defined as follows:
¬∃s, S . Γ ⊨ (µ, ι, σ , η)c :: S →∗ sc :: S ′ + S ∧ code (c) [s .µ .pc] = INVALID
Intuitively this property says that during an execution of contract
c it should never be possible to execute an INVALID instruction.
Semi-automated verification of contract-specific properties.
As demonstrated by Hildebrandt et al. [29], reachability analysis
can be effectively used for Hoare-Logic-style reasoning. This holds
in particular for the analysis tool presented in this work: Let us
consider a Hoare Logic triple {P}C{Q} where P is the precondition
(operating on the execution state), C is the contract code and Q is
the postcondition that should be satisfied after executing code C in
an execution state satisfying P . Then we can intuitively check this
claim by checking that a state satisfying ¬Q can never be reached
when starting execution in a state satisfying P . More formally, we
can define Hoare triples as reachability properties as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Hoare triples). Let c∗ be a contract and let C be a
code fragment of c∗. Let P ∈ S → B be a predicate on execution
states (strongly consistent with c∗) that models execution right
at the start of C and similarly let Q ∈ S → B be a predicate on
execution states (strongly consistent with c∗) that models execution
right at the point after executing C. Then Hoare triples {P}C{Q}
can be characterized as follows:
{P }C{Q } := ∀s . P (s) =⇒ ¬∃s′. Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →∗ s′c∗ :: S ∧ ¬Q (s′)
Hoare-Logic style reasoning can be used for the semi-automated
verification of smart contracts given that their behavior is speci-
fied in terms of pre- and postconditions. For now it still requires
a non-negligible amount of expertise to insert the corresponding
abstract conditions on the bytecode-level, but by a proper integra-
tion into the Solidity compiler the generation of the initialization
and reachability queries could be fully automated (cf. § C.1). We
want to stress that in contrast to existing approaches, our analysis
technique has the potential to provide fully automated pre- and
postcondition checking even in the presence of loops as it leverages
the fixed point engines of state-of-the-art SMT solvers [32].
4 HORST : A STATIC ANALYSIS LANGUAGE
To facilitate the principled and robust development of static an-
alyzers based on Horn clause resolution, we designed HoRSt – a
framework consisting of a high-level specification language for
defining Horn-clause based abstractions and a compiler generating
optimized smt-lib encodings for SMT-solvers. The objective of
4The Solidity Docs [21] discuss exactly this future use of static analysis tools for
assertion checking.
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Figure 9: Utilization of HoRSt for static analysis
HoRSt is to assist analysis designers in developing fast and robust
static analyzers from clean and readable logical specifications.
Many existing practical analyzers are built on top of modern
SMT-solvers such as z3. These solvers are highly optimized for
performance, which causes big performance deviations on differ-
ent problem instances and makes their internal workings (due to
the heavy use of heuristics) opaque to the user. Handcrafting logi-
cal specifications for such solvers in their low-level input format
smt-lib is hence not only cumbersome, error-prone, and requires
technical expertise, but is also very inflexible, since the performance
effects of different encodings may vary with the concrete problem
instance. For tackling this issue, HoRSt decouples the high-level
analysis design from the compilation to the input format: A high-
level specification format allows for clear, human-readable analysis
definitions while the translation process is handled by a stable and
streamlined backend. On top, it allows for easily applying and ex-
perimenting with different Horn-clause level optimizations that we
can show to enhance the performance of z3 substantially in our
problem domain. We will shortly illustrate the utilization of HoRSt
in the design process of our static analyzer and discuss the most
interesting optimizations performed by the HoRSt compiler. For an
introduction to the HoRSt language, we refer the reader to § A.1.
Designing static analyses using HoRSt. The HoRSt language al-
lows for writing math-like specifications of Horn clauses such as
those given in Figure 6. For parametrizing those clauses (e.g., by
the program counters of a specific contract) an interface with a
Java™ back-end can be specified that handles the domain specific
infrastructure, such as contract parsing. We overview the different
steps of the analysis design process in Figure 9.
The core of the analysis is the HoRSt specification. Using high-
level programming constructs such as algebraic data types, pat-
tern matching, and bounded iteration, a HoRSt specification de-
scribes Constrained Horn clauses over user-defined predicates.
Horn clauses can be parametrized by (families) of sets that are
specified in the parameter interface (e.g., the sets of all program
counters containing a certain bytecode instruction in a specific
contract). Given such a specification, the analysis designer needs
to provide infrastructure code written in Java™. In particular this
code needs to exhibit an implementation of those sets (or functions)
specified in the parameter interface. In the case of our analysis, the
environment code contains the infrastructure for contract parsing
and the parameter interface allows for accessing the assembled
contract information (code length, positions of opcodes, etc.) in
the analysis specification. The HoRSt compiler itself is utilized to
generate (optimized) smt-lib output given a HoRSt specification
and the parameter interface implementation: It unfolds the high-
level specification into separate Horn clauses over basic data types,
P1(x ) ∧ y = x + 1 ⇒ P2(y)
P2(y) ∧ z = y ∗ 3 ⇒ P3(z)
}
P1(x ) ∧ y = x + 1 ∧ z = y ∗ 3 ⇒ P3(z)
Figure 10: Unfolding of P2.
applying the interface implementation: To this end it also resolves
all high-level constructs, ensuring that the resulting Horn clauses
fall into the fragment that can be handled by z3. On top, the HoRSt
compiler (optionally) performs different optimizations and transfor-
mations on the resulting Horn clauses, before translating them into
the standardized SMT output format smt-lib. The most important
of these transformations are discussed in the following.
Low-level optimizations. One of the most effective optimizations
performed by HoRSt is the predicate elimination by unfolding Horn
clauses. This satisfiability preserving transformation has been long-
studied in the literature [17, 46] and showed beneficial for solving
Horn clauses in certain settings [16, 28]. In practice, however, the
exhaustive application of this transformation can lead to an expo-
nential blow-up in the number of Horn clauses and hence does
not necessarily yield the best results. For this reason HoRSt im-
plements different strategies for the (partial) application of this
transformation, which we call linear folding and exhaustive folding.
The idea behind the unfolding transformation is that a predicate
p can be eliminated from a set of Horn clauses Λ by unfolding the
occurrences of p in the premises according to the clauses that have
p as conclusion. An example is given in Figure 10. Here predicate P2
is eliminated by merging the two single execution steps (modeled
by the two clauses on the left) into a combined clause (on the right)
summarizing the steps.
This intuition serves as a starting point for the unfolding strategy
of linear folding. In linear folding, all clauses representing a basic
block of sequential execution steps are merged into a single clause.
More precisely, the unfolding transformation is only applied to
those predicates that are used linearly in Λ, meaning that p occurs
in the premises of exactly one clause in Λ and in the conclusion of
exactly one different clause in Λ. Linear folding has the advantage
that it runs linearly in the number of clauses in Λ and yields as
result a reduced set of clauses Λ′ such that |Λ′ | ≤ |Λ|.
In contrast, applying the unfolding transformation exhaustively
on all predicates (with exception of those that are recursively used)
might yield an exponential blow-up in clauses (and hence also re-
sult in exponential runtime). In practice however, the set of clauses
Λ′ resulting from such a exhaustive folding is often of a reasonable
size. For mitigating the runtime overhead, however, it is crucial to
avoid unnecessary blow-ups in the intermediate clause sets pro-
duced during the transformation: To this end, for exhaustive folding
HoRSt applies linear folding first and only afterwards performs the
unfoldings that multiply existing clauses.
Finally, HoRSt supports constant folding for minimizing the
smt-lib output and value encoding to map custom data types into
primitive type encodings that are efficiently solvable by z3. We refer
to § A for further details on HoRSt internals and functionalities.
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5 IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
We use HoRSt to generate the analyzer eThor which implements the
static analysis defined in § 3. In the following, we shortly overview
the design of eThor and illustrate how eThor can enhance smart
contract security in practice. To this end we conduct a case study
on a widely used library contract, showing eThor’s capability of
verifying functional correctness properties and static assertion
checks. Furthermore, we validate eThor’s soundness and precision
on the official EVM testsuite and run a large-scale evaluation for the
single-entrancy property on a set of real-world contracts from the
Ethereum blockchain, comparing eThor with the state-of-the-art
analyzer ZEUS [34].
5.1 Static Analysis Tool
The mechanics of eThor are outlined in Figure 11: eThor takes as
input the smart contract to be analyzed in bytecode-format and a
HoRSt-specification parametrized by c∗ . For enhancing the perfor-
mance and precision of the tool, eThor performs a multi-staged anal-
ysis: First, it approximates the contract jump destinations (based
on a less precise abstract semantics) which helps the tool perfor-
mance as it decouples the control flow reconstruction (which can
be performed more efficiently with a less precise abstract semantics
as typically no computations on jump destinations are performed,
but just their flow during the stack needs to be modeled) from the
more evolved abstract semantics required for precisely analyzing
the properties discussed in § 3.5. As both used semantics are sound,
the soundness of the overall analysis is not affected. In a second
pre-processing step, eThor performs a simple partial execution of
atomic program blocks in order to statically determine fixed stack
values. This can be beneficial in order to, e.g., precompute hash
values and results of exponentiation which would otherwise need
to be over-approximated in the analysis due to the lacking support
for such operations by z3. The results from the pre-analysis steps
are incorporated into the analysis by a predefined interface in the
HoRSt-specification. The HoRSt compiler then – given the interface
implementation and the specification – creates an internal Horn
clause representation which, after optionally performing different
optimizations, is translated to an smt-lib file on which the SMT-
Solver z3 is invoked. The reconstructed control flow is obtained
by a Soufflé [33] program, which was created by manually trans-
lating a HoRSt specification. Soufflé is a high performance datalog
engine, which we plan to support as a compilation target for (a
subset of) HoRSt in the near future. Since the problem of control
flow reconstruction falls into the fragment supported by modern
datalog solvers, we found Soufflé more performant than using the
general-purpose solver z3 in this context 5. However, for reasoning
about more involved properties, the expressiveness of z3 is required
as we will illustrate in § 5.2.
5z3 also implements a standard datalog engine which is restricted to work with predi-
cates over finite domains. This constraint is used to ensure that the smt-lib-expressible
Horn clauses do not leave the classical datalog-solvable fragment. However, Soufflé
overcomes this restriction in favor of a more liberal characterization of the solvable
fragment which could also be incorporated into the HoRSt language - allowing for
compilation to Soufflé from this fragment.
Smart Contract
Spec
CFG Gen
Constant Analysis
Z3
ExhaustiveLinear
Spec
Horn Clause Gen
Figure 11: Analysis outline.
5.2 Case Study: SafeMath Library
As a case study for functional correctness and assertion checkingwe
chose Solidity’s SafeMath library [4], a library implementing proper
exception behavior for standard arithmetic operations. This par-
ticularly encompasses exceptions in case of overflows in addition
and multiplications, underflows in subtractions, and division or
modulo by 0. The SafeMath library is special in that it is not a classical
library which is deployed as an own contract on the blockchain,
but its functions get inlined during the compilation of a contract
that uses them6. This specific behavior makes it particularly inter-
esting to analyze the individual library functions as their concrete
implementations may vary with changes in the compiler.
Functional Correctness. For our case study we compiled the func-
tions of the SafeMath library with a recent stable Solidity compiler
version (0.5.0) and verified that they expose the desired behavior.
In particular we showed that all functions 1) cannot return suc-
cessfully in the problematic corner cases. 2) can return successfully
with the correct result in the absence of corner cases. 3) if halting
successfully in the absence of corner cases, they can return nothing
but the correct result.
As these properties require to precisely relate different input
values over the execution (e.g., requiring that the sum of two input
values x and y exceeds 2256), we needed to slightly adapt our anal-
ysis by adding a corresponding representation of the initial input
(as word array) to theMState and the Halt predicates. This array
is accessed by the CALLDATALOAD operation which fetches the
input data. Additionally, we need to model return values by an own
predicate. For more details, we refer the reader to § C.2. Our analysis
manages to prove the corresponding functional properties for each
of the five functions within milliseconds, showcasing the effiency
of our analysis tool. Note that verifying meaningful functional cor-
rectness properties, like in this case study, requires to universally
quantify over potential inputs, hence making an analysis with a
datalog engine (such as Soufflé), which requires to explicitly list
finite initial relations, infeasible.
Static Assertion Checking. The following code snippet shows the
division function of the SafeMath library:
1 function div(uint256 a, uint256 b, string memory errorMessage)
internal pure returns (uint256) {
2 require(b > 0, errorMessage);
3 uint256 c = a / b;
4 // assert(a == b * c + a % b); // There is no case in which
this doesn't hold
5 return c; }
6In Solidity, one always needs to provide definitions of the (library) contracts one is
interacting with. In case that a library is only containing pure internal functions, the
Solidity compiler inlines this functions instead of compiling them to DELEGATECALL
call instructions to an address at which the user specified the library to reside.
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It testifies that the function used to contain an assertion which was
deemed to be unnecessary and hence removed (probably to save
gas). We reinserted this assertion and indeed could prove that the
dynamic assertion check is obsolete as it can never be violated.
5.3 Large-scale Evaluation
We performed a series of experiments to assess the overall per-
formance of our tool. In particular, we systematically evaluated
eThor’s correctness and precision on the official EVM testsuite and
additionally conducted a large scale analysis for the single-entrancy
property, comparing eThor with the ZEUS [34] static analyzer, using
the real-world dataset introduced with the latter7.
Automated Testing. For making a principled assessment of its
correctness, we evaluated eThor against the virtual machine test
cases provided by the Ethereum Foundation8. Being formulated as
pre- and postconditions, these test cases fall in the class of properties
characterized in § 2.3 and we could automatically translate them
into Horn clauses and queries in HoRSt. The test suite defines 609
test cases, 604 of which specify properties that are relevant for a
single contract setting (see § C.3 for details).
Using a 1 second timeout, we were able to solve 85% (513) of the
test cases precisely with a termination rate of 99% (597).
Reentrancy. For the call unreachability property described in Def-
inition 3.2, we evaluated eThor against the the set of real-world
contracts presented in [34]. The authors extracted 22493 real-world
contracts from the Ethereum blockchain over a period of three
months and (after deduplication) made available a list of 1524 con-
tract addresses. Due to various problems of this dataset (as described
in § D.5), sanitization leaves us with 720 distinct bytecodes out of
which we can label 100 contracts to be trivially non-reentrant (be-
cause they did not contain any possibly reentering instruction) and
2 were out of the scope of our analysis (because they contain at
least one DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE instruction) and hence
immediately classified to be potentially vulnerable. We make this
sanitized benchmark available to the community, including byte-
code and sources (where available) [6]. For 13 contracts we failed
to reconstruct the control flow graph, leaving us with 605 distinct
contracts to run our experiments on.
We ran three different experiments for evaluating eThor’s perfor-
mance for the single-entrancy property: one without performing
any Horn clause folding and two performing each one of the two
Horn clause folding variants described in § 4. The aim of this ex-
perimental set up is not only to conduct a comparison with ZEUS,
but also to showcase how eThor’s modular structure facilitates its
performance in that eThor can flexibly benefit from different opti-
mization techniques of the HoRSt compiler. In the comparison with
ZEUS, we take into account the combined result of the three dif-
ferent experiments (the contracts solvable using any of the applied
transformations). For the exhaustive folding, we only considered
instances where we could generate the smt-lib output in less than
15 minutes.9 All of the experiments were conducted on a Google
7We chose to compare with [34] as we found it the only (claimed) sound tool to support
a property comparable to single-entrancy. [48] only supports a no-write-after-call
pattern which the authors claim themselves to be different from reentrancy. [37] makes
use of a similar pattern.
8https://github.com/ethereum/tests/
9This timeout was chosen since it yielded a termination rate of > 95%.
Measure Definition eThor [34]
termination terminated/total 95.4 98.3
sensitivity tp/(tp + f n) 100 11.4
specificity tn/(tn + f p) 80 99.8
F-measure 2 ∗ (spec ∗ sens/(spec + sens)) 88.9 20.4
Table 1: Performance comparison of eThor and ZEUS [34].
total/terminated denotes the total number of contracts in the data
set/the number of contracts the respective tool terminated on. tp/fp
denotes the number of true/false positives and tn/fn the number of
true/false negatives.
Cloud Server with 24Cores at 2.8GHz and 150GiB of RAM. At most
30 queries were executed at once, each with a 10 minutes timeout.
Combining the different experiments we were able to obtain results
for all but 20 contracts.
In order to assess the precision of our tool, we compared the
results with [34]. Because of the existing unsoundness claims of [34]
in the literature [24, 47] we manually reassessed the ground truth
provided by [34] for all contracts that were labeled insecure by at
least one of the tools. Since this is a challenging and time consuming
task, especially in the case that no Solidity source code is available,
we excluded all contracts with more than 6000 bytecodes for which
we were not able to obtain the source code, which leaves us with
712 contracts for which we assessed the ground truth.
Surprisingly, we found numerous contracts labeled non-reentrant
by [34] which, if analysed in a single contract setting, definitely
were reentrant according to the definition of reentracy given in
Definition 2.1 and also according to the informal definition provided
in [34] itself10. We assume this to be an artefact of [34]’s syntactical
treatment of the call directive on the Solidity level which is, how-
ever, insufficient to catch all possible reentrancies. As the authors
claim to exclude reentrancies introduced by the send directive (even
though this is officially considered potentially insecure [22]), for
the sake of better comparability, we slightly updated our abstract
semantics to account for calls that can be deemed secure follow-
ing the same argument (namely that a small gas budget prevents
reentrancy). In the following we compare eThor against [34] on
our manually established ground truth. The results are summarized
in Table 1.
For achieving a termination rate comparable to [34] (95.4% vs.
98.3%), we needed to run our tool with a substantially higher time-
out (10 min. query timeout vs 1 min. contract time out for ZEUS).
This difference can be explained by the fact that our analysis works
on little structured bytecode in contrast to the simplified high-level
representation used by [34]. Additional overhead needs to be at-
tributed to the usage of sound abstractions on bytecode level as
well as to our different experimental setup that did not allow for
the same amount of parallelization. The soundness claim of [34]
is challenged by the experimentally assessed sensitivity of only
11.4%. One possible explanation for this low value, which deviates
from the numbers reported in [34] on the same data set, is that
the intuition guiding the manual investigation performed by [34]
10[34] gives the following informal definition: ‘A function is reentrant if it can be
interrupted while in the midst of its execution, and safely re-invoked even before its
previous invocations complete execution.’
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Figure 12: Query runtimes inms for the combined approach
itemized by queries. A red/green/blue dot denotes a query solved
fastest with no/linear/exhaustive folding.
departed from the notion of single-entrancy and the intuitive def-
inition given by the authors. This highlights the importance of
formalizing not only the analysis technique but also the security
properties to be verified. When interpreting the high specificity
of [34] (almost 100%) one should consider that ZEUS labels only
22 contracts vulnerable in total out of which one is a false positive.
Given that the dataset is biased towards safe contracts (517 safe as
opposed to 195 unsafe ones) a high specificity can be the result of a
tool’s tendency to label contracts erroneously secure. Due to the
proven soundness, for eThor such a behavior is excluded by design.
This overall advantage in accuracy of eThor over ZEUS is reflected
by eThor’s F-measure of 88.9% as opposed to 20.4% for ZEUS.
Horn Clause Folding. Our experimental evaluation shows that,
while both forms of Horn clause folding improve the termination
rate, the results of the different foldings are not directly comparable.
This is illustrated by Figure 12 which plots the (lowest) termination
times for those queries that terminated within 200 seconds during
the large-scale experiment. The different colors indicate the kind of
optimization (no/linear/exhaustive folding) that was fastest to solve
the corresponding query. The distribution of the dots shows that
in the range of low query times (indicating more simply structured
contracts) exhaustive folding (depicted in blue) dominates. However,
for longer query times, often the linear folding (depicted in green)
shows a better performance. One possible explanation for this is
that for more complex contracts, the blow-up in rules created by
the exhaustive folding exceeds the benefits of eliminating more
predicates. Interestingly, for few instances, even applying no folding
at all (indicated in red) led to the fastest termination. We can only
explain this behavior by special heuristics used inside z3 that helped
these particular cases. This shows the lacking predictability of z3
and thereby motivates the necessity of high-level tools like HoRSt
that allow users to easily combine different optimizations in order
to obtain results reliably.
6 RELATEDWORK & DISCUSSION
In the last years there has been plenty of work on the automatic
analysis of Ethereum smart contracts. These works can be clas-
sified in dynamic and static analysis approaches: An example of
a dynamic approach is the work by Grossmann et al. [26] which
studies effectively callback freedom, a property characterizing the
absence of reentrancy bugs, and provides a dynamic detection algo-
rithm for it. Besides that the authors prove that statically showing
a smart contract to be effectively callback free is indeed undecid-
able. This work serves as a motivation why the correct and precise
static analysis of smart contracts with respect to relevant security
properties is challenging and requires the usage of suitable (sound)
abstractions in order to be feasible, or even possible.
As a consequence, most practical static analysis tools so far
focused on the heuristic detection of certain (classes of) bugs. These
works do not strive for any theoretical guarantees nor do they
aim for giving formal (and semantic) characterizations of security
properties that the analysis targets. Important representatives of
such bug-finding tools are the static analyzer Oyente [38] which
was the first static analyzer for Ethereum smart contracts and the
tool Osiris [47] which focuses on the detection of integer bugs.
Since the aim and scope of these tools differ substantially from the
ones of eThor , we omit a more detailed discussion and refer the
interested reader to recent surveys [19, 24, 36] for more details.
In contrast to pure bug-finding, some recent works target a sound
and automated static analysis of smart contract security properties.
In particular the tools Securify [48], ZEUS [34], EtherTrust [24],
and NeuCheck [37] make such soundness claims.
Securify implements a dependency analysis based on the recon-
structed control-flow graph of contract bytecode and expresses
some generic security properties in terms of these dependencies.
The paper claims that the dependency patterns which they provide
are either sufficient for the satisfaction (compliance patterns) or
the violation (violation patterns) of a property. However, no proofs
for the correctness of the control-flow-graph transformation, the
soundness of the dependency analysis itself, or the relationship
between the security patterns and the properties are provided. As a
consequence we could empirically show that Securify’s algorithm
for control-flow reconstruction is unsound and give counterexam-
ples for 13 out of 17 patterns (which partly also indicate a flaw in
the dependency analysis itself). In § D we give a detailed account
of these issues.
NeuCheck is a tool for analysing Solidity smart contracts by
searching for patterns in the contract syntax graph. The soundness
claim of the work is neither substantiated by a soundness statement,
nor proof. Also no semantics of Solidity is given and no (formal)
security properties are formulated. This lack of formalism makes it
hard to validate any soundness claim. Despite the missing formal
connections, the given patterns are clearly of syntactic nature and
can be argued not to match the intuitive properties given through-
out the paper which makes NeuCheck rather a bug-finding and
style-checking tool. For more details we refer to § D.
Similar to NeuCheck, ZEUS analyzes smart contracts written in
Solidity. To this end, it transforms Solidity smart contracts into an
abstract intermediate language and later into LLVM bitcode which
allows for leveraging existing symbolic model checkers. The code
transformations are claimed to be semantics preserving which how-
ever has already been refuted by [24]. Additionally, the analyzed
security properties are neither formally defined nor are they trans-
lated for model checking in a streamlined fashion: while some of
them are compiled to assertions, other properties require additional
code transformations which we show to be flawed in § D. Empirical
13
Accepted for ACM CCS, 2020 Clara Schneidewind, Ilya Grishchenko, Markus Scherer, and Matteo Maffei
evidence for the unsoundness of ZEUS has been reported by [47]
and is emphasized by the empirical evaluation in § 5.
The work presented in [24] surveys different approaches to static
analysis and aims at illustrating design choices and challenges in
sound static analysis. The work also discusses EtherTrust, a first
proof of concept for a reachability analysis based on Horn clauses,
which however is still preliminary and exhibits soundness issues
in its abstraction as discussed § D.
For avoiding the pitfalls leading to unsoundness in the presented
works, eThor follows a principled design approach: Starting from
the formal EVM semantics defined in [25], it formulates an abstract
semantics in the specification language HoRSt which is proven
sound with respect to the concrete semantics, hence covering all
particularities of the EVM bytecode language. Based on this abstract
semantic specification, a streamlined compilation process creates an
SMT-encoding which is again systematically tested for soundness
against the official test suite to minimize the effect of implemen-
tation bugs. The challenge of sound control flow reconstruction
is solved by basing a corresponding preanalysis on a proper relax-
ation of the provably sound abstract semantics in the Soufflé format,
ensuring that the original soundness guarantees are inherited. For
a more robust development, it is planned to also streamline this
process in the future by making the HoRSt compiler support Soufflé
as additional output format for a restricted Horn clause fragment.
For providing end-to-end guarantees of the resulting static ana-
lyzer, we do not only ensure the soundness of the core analysis by
proofs and testing, but also give provably sound approximations
for relevant formalized semantic security properties suitable for
encoding in the analysis framework.
7 CONCLUSION
We presented eThor , the first automated tool implementing a sound
static analysis technique for EVM bytecode, showing how to ab-
stract the semantics of EVM bytecode into a set of Horn clauses
and to express security as well as functional properties in terms of
reachability queries, which are solved using z3. In order to ensure
the long-term maintenance of the static analyzer and facilitate fu-
ture refinements, we designed HoRSt, a development framework for
Horn-clause based static analysis tools, which given a high-level
specification of Horn clauses automatically generates an optimized
implementation in the smt-lib format. We successfully evaluated
eThor against the official Ethereum test suite to gain further con-
fidence in our implementation and conducted a large-scale eval-
uation, demonstrating the practicality of our approach. Within a
large-scale experiment we compared eThor to the state-of-the-art
analysis tool ZEUS, demonstrating that eThor surpasses ZEUS in
terms of overall performance (as quantified by the F-measure).
This work opens up several interesting research directions. For
instance, we plan to extend our analysis as well as HoRSt to re-
lational properties, since some interesting security properties for
smart contracts can be defined in terms of 2-safety properties [25].
Furthermore, we intend to further refine the analysis in order to
enhance its precision, e.g., by extending the approach to a multi-
contract setting, introducing abstractions for calls that approximate
the account’s persistent storage and local memory after calling
more accurately. Furthermore, we plan to significantly extend the
scope of HoRSt. First, we intend to make the specification of the
static analysis accessible to proof assistants in order to mechanize
soundness proofs. Furthermore, we intend to explore the automated
generation of static analysis patterns from the specification of the
concrete semantics, in order to further reduce the domain knowl-
edge required in the design of static analyzers.
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APPENDIX
The appendix is structured as follows: In § A we overview the
analysis specification language HoRSt. In § B we make the theo-
retical foundations of our work explicit, in particular we give the
soundness proof of our analysis. § C gives details on how the se-
curity properties discussed in the paper are implemented in eThor
using HoRSt. Finally, in § D we discuss the soundness issues in
related works and give concrete counterexamples for highlighting
soundness flaws in existing static analyzers.
A HORST
This section gives an introduction to the newly developed language
HoRSt that allows for the high-level specification of Horn-clause
based static analyses. We will first give a short primer that illus-
trates the main functionality of HoRSt, followed by a more detailed
discussion of HoRSt’s language features.
A.1 HoRSt by Example
For illustrating the features of HoRSt we show how to express a
general rule for binary stack operations, subsuming the rule for
addition presented in § 3. Figure 13 shows an excerpt of the HoRSt-
specification of the presented static analysis. The abstract domain
of the analysis is realized by the definition of the abstract datatype
AbsDom. Predicate signatures can be specified by corresponding predi-
cate declarations as done for the case of the MState predicate. HoRSt
allows for parametrizing predicates and thereby specifying whole
predicate families: The MState predicate is parametrized by two in-
teger values (as specified in the curly braces) that will intuitively
correspond to the contract’s identifier and the program counter
whose state it is approximating. The arguments of the MState predi-
cate family reflect exactly those specified in § 3.
To facilitatemodular specifications,HoRSt supports non-recursive
operations over arbitrary types, such as absadd which implements
abstract addition. In the given example, we show the flexibility of
HoRSt by presenting a single rule template for generating rules for
all binary stack operations. To this end, we define a function binOp
that given an opcode c and two integer arguments applies to them
the binary operation corresponding to the opcode. This function is
then leveraged in the rule template opBin. Rule templates serve for
generating the abstract semantics given in the form of Horn clauses.
As in our case the abstract semantics is specified as a function on a
concrete contract, the generation of horn clauses in HoRSt needs
to be linked to a concrete contract bytecode. In order to account
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1 datatype AbsDom := @T | @V <int >; // Abstract Domain
2 datatype Opcode := @STOP | @ADD | ... | @INVALID | @SELFDESTRUCT // opcodes (shortened)
3
4 pred MState{int*int}: int * array <AbsDom > * array <AbsDom > * array <AbsDom > * bool;
5
6 op absadd(a: AbsDom , b: AbsDom): AbsDom := match (a, b) with | (@V(x), @V(y)) => @V((x + y) mod MAX) | _ => @T;
7 op binOp(c: Opcode , x: AbsDom , y: AbsDom): AbsDom := match c with | @ADD => absadd(x, y) | ... | _ => @T;
8
9 sel ids: unit -> [int]; // contracts to be analyzed
10 sel binOps: unit -> [int]; // binary stack operations
11 sel pcsForIdAndOpcode: int * int -> [int]; // program counters at which a specific opcode occurs in a specific contract
12 sel argumentsTwoForIdAndPc: int * int -> [int * int]; // results from the preanalysis for a given contract and pc
13
14 op tryConcrete {!c:int}(val:AbsDom): AbsDom := (!c = ~1) ? (val) : (@V(!c));
15
16 rule opBin :=
17 for (!op: int) in binOps (),
18 (!id: int) in ids(),
19 (!pc: int) in pcsForIdAndOpcode (!id, !op),
20 (!a:int , !b: int) in argumentsTwoForIdAndPc (!id, !pc)
21 clause [?x: AbsDom , ?y:AbsDom , ?size: int , ?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?cl: bool]
22 MState {!id, !pc}(?size , ?sa, ?mem , ?stor , ?cl), ?size > 1,
23 ?x = tryConcrete {!a} (select ?sa (?size -1)),
24 ?y = tryConcrete {!b} (select ?sa (?size -2))
25 => MState {!id, !pc +1}(? size -1, store ?sa (?size -2) (binOp(intToOpCode(!op), ?x,?y)), ?mem , ?stor , ?cl);
Figure 13: HoRSt rule describing the abstract semantics of local binary stack operations.
for that in a generic fashion given that HoRSt cannot support fa-
cilities for reading files or parsing bytecodes, HoRSt provides an
interface for interacting with custom relations generated by Java™
code. This interface is specified upfront by so called selector func-
tions (introduced with the key word sel) which are declared, but not
defined in the HoRSt specification. In the given example, we declare
selector functions for accessing the identifiers of the contracts to
be analyzed (ids), the set of binary operations (binOps) and for the
program counters in a contract that hold opcodes of a specific type
(pcForIdAndOpcode). In addition to that, selector functions also allow for
more advanced functionalities such as incorporating the results of
a pre-analysis in an elegant fashion: To this end, we declare the
selector function argumentsTwoForIdAndPc that returns arguments to the
operation that could be statically pre-computed (returning −1 in
case of failure). For generating Horn clauses, we can parametrize
the rule over the cross product of the result of (nested) selector
function applications as done in for the opBin rule. This then exactly
generates Horn clauses abstracting the behavior of a binary stack
operation as discussed in § 3: A stack size check is performed, the
two arguments are selected from the stack and finally the MState pred-
icate at the next program counter is implied with an updated stack
having the operation’s result as top element. The only derivation
occurs due to the consideration of the pre-analysis: the operation
tryConcrete tries to access the statically precomputed argument, and
only in case its absence performs the (more expensive) stack ac-
cess. This step however is not a necessity, but just illustrates how
the interplay between different stages of a static analysis can be
implemented for boosting the performance.
A.2 HoRSt in Detail
In the following, we present a short overview of the features of
HoRSt.
Types and Operations. For specifying the super domain D of
the abstraction, HoRSt provides in addition to the primitive types
Boolean and Integer, non-recursive sum types and arrays over
all types. The type of abstract values Dˆ used in § 3 that consists of
the unknown value ⊤ and concrete integer values, can be defined
as follows:
1 datatype AbsDom = @T | @V<int >;
In addition, HoRSt allows us to define non-recursive operations
over arbitrary types. These operations are implemented as hygienic
macros on the expression level. To work with sum types, HoRSt
provides match expressions. This mechanism can, e.g., be used to
define the abstract addition operation described in § 3.2 as follows:
1 op absadd(a: AbsDom , b: AbsDom): AbsDom :=
2 match (a, b) with
3 | (@V(x), @V(y)) => @V(x + y) // for two concrete values ,
return sum
4 | _ => @T; // else return top
Predicates. The abstraction’s predicate signature S is given in
terms of predicate declarations. A predicate declaration introduces
a predicate symbol that ranges over arguments of arbitrary types.
HoRSt supports a mechanism for declaring a whole family of predi-
cateswith the same argument types by allowing for the specification
of compile-time constants that we will from now on call parameters.
We illustrate the syntax of predicate declarations with the predicate
MStatepc defined in Figure 4 that models an abstract execution
state:
1 pred MState{int}: int * array <AbsDom > * array <AbsDom > * array <
AbsDom > * bool;
The declared predicate has one parameter of type int and five ar-
guments. The parameter represents the program counter pc and
should be considered part of the predicate name. The distinction
between parameters and arguments is supported by HoRSt for per-
formance reasons: different parameter instantiations are compiled
to different predicate names in the underlying SMT representation
which leads to speed-ups in practice and additionally facilitates the
folding optimization discussed in § 4. Selector Functions. HoRSt
itself provides no facilities to read files, parse bytecode, etc. Instead,
these tasks are handled by Java™ code. HoRSt interacts with this
Java™ code by an upfront-specified interface which is implemented
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by so-called selector functions. The tasks performed by selector
functions can be as easy as providing an interval of integers or
as complicated as precomputing the results of certain bytecode
operations, from a HoRSt perspective we only see the interface
provided by selector function declarations that associate selector
function names with their type signature. Selector functions are
restricted to take a fixed number of arguments of primitive types
and to return a sequence of tuples of primitive types.
Examples of selector function declarations are given below:
1 sel interval: int -> [int]; // integers from 0 to (n-1)
2 sel pcsForOpcode: int -> [int]; // program counters for given
opcode
3 sel pcsAndValuesForOpcode: int -> [int*int]; // program
counters and precomputed values
In general, selector functions can be seen as the bridge between the
analysis specification and the parts of the software stack respon-
sible for preprocessing (parsing, etc.) real world smart contracts.
For instance, as previously discussed, the predicate signature Sc∗ ,
the abstraction function αc∗ as well as the abstract semantics δ (c∗)
are dependent on the concrete contract c∗ under analysis. Selec-
tor functions allow us to implement such a parametrization (e.g.,
iterating over opcode sequences in order to generate rules in δ (c∗)
according to the opcode at each program counter).
The separation of concerns introduced by selector functions
helps to keep the HoRSt specifications declarative while the tech-
nical details of providing the actual values can be tested by unit
tests.
Rules. The fundamental abstraction of HoRSt is the concept of rule,
which essentially describes a collection of Horn clauses. It therefore
can be seen as the mechanism for specifying the abstract semantics
δ (c∗). A rule is either a singleton rule that is just instantiated once
or may act as a template for arbitrarily many instantiations – hence
describing a family of rules. The second case is enabled by the use of
selector functions which provide the sequence that the rule family
ranges over. More technically, for each tuple returned by a selector
function the parameters of the rule template will be instantiated
according to the tuple values.
The rule shown in Figure 14 for example will be instantiated for
all program counters !pc at which c∗ holds anMSTORE instruction.
The sequence of these program counters is provided by the selector
function pcsForOpcode that maps opcodes to their corresponding
set of occurrences (identified by program counter) in c∗.
Within the body of rules we can define (optionally hygienic)
macros that we can use in the subsequent clauses of the rule. The
clauses themselves (declared with keyword clause), describe a
Horn clause consisting of a list of premises and a conclusion rang-
ing over free variables which need to be explicitly declared upfront.
Premises are lists of predicate applications and boolean HoRSt ex-
pressions while the conclusion may only consist of a single predi-
cate application. The example in Figure 14 defines three clauses that
exactly correspond to the Horn clauses defined for LMSTOREMpc
in Figure 6.
Sum Expressions. Selector functions can not only be used to gen-
erate rules, but can also be used at the expression level. So-called
sum expressions exist in two different shapes: in the simple case
(shown later in Figure 18), predefined associative operations (addi-
tion, multiplication, disjunction and conjunction) are used to join
expressions that may make use of the values returned by the selec-
tor function; the generalized case can be seen in line 2 of Figure 14.
The operation valToMemWord updates 32 consecutive memory cells of mem
with fractions of the value v starting from position o— mem is the start
value, store x (o + !a)(absExtractByteL{!a}(v)) is the iterated expression
(x acts as a placeholder for the last iteration step’s result).
Queries. In order to check for reachability of abstract configura-
tions, HoRSt allows for the specification of (reachability) queries
that can also be generated from selector functions. The query shown
in Figure 15 for instance, checks for reentrancy by checking if any
CALL instruction is reachable with call level cℓ = 1 (here encoded as
bool). It therefore is an implementation of the reachability property
introduced in § 3.5.
Note that if there is a notion of an expected outcome, we can
define queries with the keyword test as seen in Figure 18.
B THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHOR
In this section, we provide details on the theoretical foundations of
eThor .We start by formally characterizing the notion of Horn-clause
based abstractions as they can be implemented in HoRSt and relate
this concept to the general framework of abstract interpretation.
Next, we provide missing details on the definition of the static
analysis underlying eThor and conclude with a detailed proof sketch
of the soundness statement for this analysis.
B.1 Horn-clause based abstractions
In this section, we more formally characterize the aim and scope of
this work, as well as the kind of static analyses that are realizable by
HoRSt. Generally, we focus on the reachability analysis of programs
with a small-step semantics, which we over-approximate by an
abstract program semantics based on Horn clauses. More formally,
we will assume a program’s small-step semantics to be a binary
relation Ss over program configurations c ∈ C. A Horn-clause based
abstraction for such a small-step semantics Ss is then fully specified
by a tuple (D,S,α ,Λ) where S defines the signature of predicates
with arguments ranging over (partially) ordered subsets ofD. For a
given a predicate signature S, an abstraction function α : C → A
maps concrete program configurations c ∈ C to abstract program
configurations ∆ ∈ A consisting of instances of predicates in S.
Formally, a predicate signature S ∈ N ↛∏(P(D) × (P(D) ×
P(D))) is a partial function from predicate names N to their argu-
ment types (formally written as a product over the subsets of some
abstract superdomain D, equipped with a corresponding order).
We require for all n ∈ N that (D, ≤) ∈ S(n) that (D, ≤) forms a
partially ordered set. Correspondingly, the set of abstract config-
urations AS over S can be defined as P({n(®v) | n ∈ N ∧ ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , |S(n)|}. πi (S(n)) = (D, ≤) =⇒ πi (®v) ∈ D}) where πi (·)
denotes the usual projection operator. The abstraction of a small-
step semantics is then a set of constrained Horn clauses Λ ⊆ H(S)
that approximates the small-step execution rules.
A constrained horn clause is a first order formula of the form
∀X . Φ, P ⇒ c
Where X ⊆ Vars × P(D) is a (functional) set of typed variables,
and Φ is a set of quantifier free constraints over the variables in X .
Conclusions c are predicate applications n(®z) ∈ PX := {n(®x) | | ®x | =
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1 op valToMemWord (v: AbsDom , mem: array <AbsDom >, o: int): array <AbsDom > :=
2 for (!a: int) in interval (32): x: array <AbsDom > -> store x (o + !a) (absExtractByteL {!a}(v)), mem;
3 op isConcrete(a: AbsDom): bool := match a with | @T => false | _ => true;
4 op extractConcrete(a: AbsDom): int := match a with | @V(x) => x | _ => 0;
5
6 rule opMstore :=
7 for (!id: int) in ids(),
8 (!pc:int) in pcsForIdAndOpcode (!id, MSTORE),
9 (!p: int , !v: int) in argumentsTwoForIdAndPc (!id , !pc)
10 clause [?size: int , ?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?cl: bool , ?offset: AbsDom , ?p: int , ?v: AbsDom]
11 MState {!id ,!pc}(?size , ?sa, ?mem , ?stor , ?cl), ?size > 1,
12 !p != ~1,
13 ?v = tryConcrete {!v}( select ?sa (?size -2))
14 => MState {!id, !pc +1}(? size - 2, ?sa, writeWord {!p}(?v, ?mem), ?stor , ?cl),
15 clause [?size: int , ?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?cl: bool , ?pos: AbsDom ,
16 ?v: AbsDom , ?memn: array <AbsDom >]
17 MState {!id ,!pc}(?size , ?sa , ?mem , ?stor , ?cl), ?size > 1,
18 !p = ~1,
19 ?pos = select ?sa (?size -1),
20 ?v = tryConcrete {!v}( select ?sa (?size -2)),
21 ?memn = (isConcrete (?pos)) ? (writeWordEven(extractConcrete (?pos), ?v, ?mem)) : ([@T])
22 => MState {!id, !pc +1}(? size - 2, ?sa, ?memn , ?stor , ?cl);
Figure 14: HoRSt rule describing the abstract semantics of the local memory write operation LMSTOREMpc
1 query reentrancyCall
2 for (!id: int) in ids(),
3 (!pc:int) in pcsForIdAndOpcode (!id, CALL)
4 [?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >,
5 ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?size:int]
6 MState {!id, !pc}(?size , ?sa, ?mem , ?stor , true);
Figure 15: HoRSt-query for reeentrancy.
|S(n)| ∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , | ®x |}. πi (®x) = x ∧ πi (S(n)) = (D, ≤) =⇒
(x ,D) ∈ X } over variables inX that respect the variable type. Corre-
spondingly, the premises P ⊆ PX , are a set of predicate applications
over variables in X .
We lift the suborders of S to an order on abstract configurations
∆1,∆2 ∈ AS as follows:
n1( ®t1) ≤p n2( ®t2) := n1 = n2
∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , | ®t1 | }. πi ( ®t1) ≤n1,i πi ( ®t2)
given πi (S(n)) = (Dn,i , ≤n,i )
∆1 ≤ ∆2 := ∀p1 ∈ ∆1 . ∃p2 ∈ ∆2 . p1 ≤p p2
Finally, we introduce the notion of soundness for a Horn-clause
based abstraction.
Definition B.1. AHorn-clause based abstraction (D,S,α ,Λ) soundly
approximates a small-step semantics Ss if
∀(c, c′) ∈ S∗s . ∀∆. α (c) ≤ ∆
⇒ ∃∆′. ∆, Λ ⊢ ∆′ ∧ α (c′) ≤ ∆′ (1)
This statement requires that, whenever a concrete configura-
tion c ′ is reachable from configuration c (meaning that (c, c ′) is
contained in the reflexive and transitive closure of Ss, denoted as
S∗s ), it shall hold that from all abstractions ∆ of c , the Horn clause
abstraction allows us to logically derive (⊢) a valid abstraction ∆′
of c ′. Note that α intuitively yields the most concrete abstraction
of a configuration, hence to make the property hold for all possible
abstractions of a configuration, we strengthen the property to hold
for all abstractions that are more abstract than α(c). The soundness
theorem implies that whenever we can show that from some ab-
straction ∆ of a configuration c there is no abstract configuration
∆′ derivable such that ∆′ abstracts c ′, then c ′ is not reachable from
c . Consequently, if it is possible to enumerate all abstractions of
c ′, checking non-derivability (as it is supported by the fixedpoint
engines of modern SMT solvers) gives us a procedure for proving
unreachability of program configurations.
Relation to abstract interpretation. It is possible to phrase the
previous characterization in terms of classical abstract interpreta-
tion notions. More precisely, we can define a Galois connection
(α ,γ ) between sets of concrete configurations P(C) (ordered by ⊆)
and abstract configurations A (ordered by ≤). To this end, we lift
the abstraction function α to subsets in a canonical fashion:
α(C) :=
⋃
c ∈C
α(c) (2)
Next, we define the the concretization function with the help of
α :
γ (∆) := {c ∈ C | α(c) ≤ ∆}
Lemma B.2. The pair of functions (α ,γ ) forms a Galois connection
between (P(C), ⊆) and (A, ≤).
Proof. We need to show for all C and ∆ that
α(C) ≤ ∆⇔ C ⊆ γ (∆)
⇒: Let α(C) ≤ ∆. Further let c ∈ C . We show that c ∈ γ (∆).
By the definition of γ it is sufficient to show that α(c) ≤ ∆.
Let p1 ∈ α(c). We show that there is some p2 ∈ ∆ such that
p1 ≤ p2. Since p1 ∈ α(c) and c ∈ C , we know that p1 ∈ α(C)
and since α(C) ≤ ∆ also that there needs to be some p2 ∈ ∆
such that p1 ≤ p2 what concludes the proof.
⇐: Let C ⊆ γ (∆). Further let p1 ∈ α(C). We show that there is
some p2 ∈ ∆ such that p1 ≤ p2. Since p1 ∈ α(C) there must
be some c ∈ C such that p1 ∈ α(c). And from C ⊆ γ (∆) we
can conclude that c ∈ γ (∆) which implies that α(c) ≤ ∆.
Consequently there needs to be a p2 ∈ ∆ such that p1 ≤ p2
what concludes the proof.
□
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Now, we can define reachability on concrete configurations and
derivability of abstract configurations as the least fixed points of
step functions which describe a collecting semantics (with respect
to some initial configuration).
FI (C) := {c ′ | ∃c ∈ C . (c, c ′) ∈ Ss} ∪ I
F ′∆I (∆) := {p | ∆,Λ ⊢ p} ∪ ∆I
We obtain the following intuitive correspondences between the
different characterizations:
(c, c ′) ∈ S∗s ⇔ c ′ ∈ lfp[F {c }] (3)
∆,Λ ⊢ ∆′ ⇔ ∆′ ⊆ lfp[F ′∆] (4)
where lfp[f ] denotes the least fixed point of a function f .
To ensure that the corresponding least fixed points exists, we
need to ensure that the domains P(C) and A of the Galois connec-
tion form a complete lattice and that both FI and F ′∆I are monotone.
While ⟨P(C), ⊆, ∅,P(C),∪,∩⟩ is the canonical power set lattice,
we can easily show ⟨A, ≤, ∅,∆,∪,∩⟩ to also form a complete lat-
tice as ⊆ is a subrelation of ≤. While it is trivial to show that FI is
monotone, for F ′∆I it becomes a proof obligation on Λ:
∀∆,∆′. ∆ ≤ ∆′ ∧ ∆,Λ ⊢ p =⇒ ∃p′.p ≤ p′ ∧ ∆′,Λ ⊢ p′ (5)
Using the step functions, we can characterize sound over-
approximations as defined in Definition B.1 in an alternative fashion.
More precisely, we require our approximation to be a sound upper
approximation [18].
Lemma B.3. A Horn-clause based abstraction
(D, {≤n,i }(n,i),S,α ,Λ) soundly approximates a small-step
semantics Ss iff Λ satisfies Equation (5) and for all c ∈ C and all
∆ ≥ α(c)
α(lfp[F {c }]) ≤ lfp[F ′∆]
Proof. "⇒": Assume Equation (1) and f1 ∈ α(lfp[F {c }]) for
some fact f1. We show that there exists some fact f2 such that
f2 ∈ lfp[F ′∆] and f1 ≤ f2. By Equation (2), we know that from f1 ∈
α(lfp[F {c }]) we can conclude that there exists some c ′ ∈ lfp[F {c }]
such that f1 ∈ α(c ′). By Equation (3), we have that (c, c ′) ∈ S∗s
and hence by Equation (1) we can conclude that there exists some
∆′ such that ∆,Λ ⊢ ∆′ and α(c ′) ≤ ∆′. With f1 ∈ α(c ′) we get
from this that there exists some f2 ∈ ∆′ such that f1 ≤ f2. Since
∆,Λ ⊢ ∆′, we get from Equation (4) that ∆′ ⊆ lfp[F ′∆] and hence
also f2 ∈ lfp[F ′∆] which concludes the proof.
"⇐": Assume α(lfp[F {c }]) ≤ lfp[F ′∆] and let (c, c ′) ∈ S∗s and
α(c) ≤ ∆. We show that there is some ∆′ such that ∆,Λ ⊢ ∆′
and α(c ′) ≤ ∆′. By Equation (3), we get that c ′ ∈ lfp[F {c }] and
hence also α(c ′) ⊆ α(lfp[F {c }]) (by Equation (2)). As α(lfp[F {c }]) ≤
lfp[F ′∆] it follows that also α(c ′) ≤ lfp[F ′∆]. Additionally, it follows
from Equation (4) immediately that ∆,Λ ⊢ lfp[F ′∆]. This closes our
proof. □
Given that F ′∆ is monotonic, α(lfp[F {c }]) ≤ lfp[F ′∆] can be shown
to be a consequence of the following one-step characterization:
α ◦ F ≤ F ′ ◦ α (6)
(where F = F∅ and F ′ = F ′∅).
This is as α ◦ F ≤ F ′ ◦ α implies for all c ∈ C and all ∆ ≥ α(c)
that α ◦ F {c } ≤ F ′∆ ◦ α and by the fixed point transfer theorem [18]
for Galois connections, this result can be lifted to least fixed points.
As a consequence for proving Theorem 3.1, it is sufficient to show
that Equation (5) and Equation (6) hold.
B.2 Analysis Definition (continued)
We overview additional details of the analysis definition introduced
in § 3.
First, we formally define the orders on the abstract argument
domains for the predicates defined in Figure 4.
≤Dˆ := {(aˆ, bˆ) | bˆ = ⊤ ∨ aˆ = bˆ}
≤N := {(m,n) |m = n}
≤B := {(a,b) | a = b}
≤N→Dˆ := {(f ,д) | ∀n ∈ N. f (n) ≤Dˆ д(n)}
≤N×(N→Dˆ) := {((m, f ), (n,д)) |m = n ∧ ∀i < m. f (i) ≤Dˆ д(i)}
We assume that the same orders apply to the same argument do-
mains of different predicates.
Some of the partially ordered described by the argument domains
and their corresponding order, have a supremum, as formally stated
in the following lemma:
Lemma B.4 (Suprema of argument domains). The following
statements hold:
• ∀aˆ ∈ Dˆ. aˆ ≤Dˆ ⊤
• ∀f ∈ N→ Dˆ. f ≤N→Dˆ λx .⊤
Abstract operations.We formally define abstract operations on
values from the abstract argument domains, starting with binary
operations on natural numbers: Let opbin ∈ N×N→ N be a binary
operation. We define abstract binary operations as follows:
·̂ ∈ (N × N→ N) → Dˆ × Dˆ → Dˆ
opbin (xˆ , yˆ) := {opbin(xˆ , yˆ) xˆ , yˆ ∈ N⊤ otherwise
Similarly, we can define abstract comparison operators. Let
opcomp ∈ N × N→ B be a comparison operation on natural num-
bers. We define abstract comparison operations as follows:
·̂ ∈ (N × N→ B) → Dˆ × Dˆ → B
opcomp (xˆ , yˆ) := {opcomp(xˆ , yˆ) xˆ , yˆ ∈ N1 otherwise
Next, we define the abstract operations for memory access used
in Figure 7 and Figure 5.
First we define the function for extracting a specified fraction of
an integer (interpreted as 32 byte word)
·[·, ·] ∈ Dˆ × N × N→ Dˆ
vˆ[l,r ] :=
{⌊
vˆ
25631−r
⌋
mod 256r−l+1 l ≤ r ∧ vˆ ∈ N
⊤ otherwise
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Next we define the append function:
| | · ∈ Dˆ × Dˆ × N→ Dˆ
vˆ | |nwˆ :=
{
wˆ ∗ 256n + vˆ vˆ, wˆ ∈ N
⊤ otherwise
We focused here only those operations that were used in § 3. For
a full account of all abstract operations, we refer the reader to our
HoRSt specification in § A.
B.3 Proof of soundness
For proving Theorem 3.1, we will not make an immediate use of the
proof strategy presented in § B.1. Even though we proof monotonic-
ity (Equation (5)) separately, since this facilitates the reasoning in
the individual cases, we will in the end go for a direct proof of the
statement in Theorem 3.1 proceeding by complete induction of the
number of small-steps. The reason for that is that for proving our
abstraction sound one-step reasoning is not sufficient as we need
to argue about execution steps that lie further ahead (hence the use
of complete induction).
For the sake of concise presentation, we will only present a proof
sketch (featuring the most interesting and challenging cases) and
state, but not prove, auxiliary lemmas.
Auxiliary lemmas. For reasoning about the soundness, we first
need to state some general properties of the small-step execution
and the shapes of callstacks that might appear during this execution.
We omit the proofs for most of these properties as those are mostly
straight-forward case distinctions and simple inductions.
The following lemmas summarize some general properties of
callstack evolution during the execution. The small-step semantics
is designed such that the callstack records the execution state as
at the point of calling. The corresponding states only get modified
when returning from an internal transaction. In this case, modifi-
cation is guaranteed, since the gas for the execution is subtracted.
As a consequence, an unmodified (sub) callstack indicates that the
execution of the same internal transaction is still executed. More
formally this is captured by the following lemma:
Lemma B.5 (Callstack preservation during execution). Let
(Γ, S) be a configuration such that Γ ⊨ U + S →∗ U ′ + S . Then the
following properties hold:
• ifU ′ = ϵ thenU = ϵ
• if U = ϵ and U ′ , ϵ then there are s ∈ S, c ∈ C such that
Γ ⊨ S → sc :: S and Γ ⊨ sc :: S →∗ U ′ + S .
• if U ′ , ϵ and Γ ⊨ U + S →∗ S ′ and Γ ⊨ S ′ →∗ U ′ + S then
there existsU ′′ such that |U ′′ | > 0 and S ′ = U ′′ + S
We introduce the notion of a call state for characterizing those
states that invoke internal transactions.
Definition B.6 (Call states). A regular execution state s is a call
state if Γ ⊨ s :: S → s ′ :: s :: S for some Γ, S and s ′.
Intuitively, an execution state is a call state if it satisfies all
preconditions for a transaction initiating instruction.
In a regular execution all elements of a callstack but its top
element are call states.
Lemma B.7. Let Γ ⊨ s :: S →∗ s ′ :: S ′ + S , then every execution state
s ′′ ∈ S ′ is a call state.
Whenever some configuration is reachable, the execution before
stepped through the call states on the callstacks. This property is
formally captured by the following lemma:
Lemma B.8. Let Γ ⊨ S →n (S1 + S2) + S . Then there exists some
m ∈ N such that Γ ⊨ S →m S2 + S and Γ ⊨ S2 + S →n−m
(S1 + S2) + S .
As previously discussed, we assume execution states to be anno-
tated with the contracts that they are currently executing. These
annotations need to be consistent with the current execution state
in the sense that they correspond to the active account of the ex-
ecution state and that they present a valid contract in the global
state.
Definition B.9 (Annotation consistency). An execution state s is
consistent with contract annotation c if the following two condi-
tions hold
(1) isRegular(s) =⇒ s .ι.actor = c .addr
(2) isRegular(s) ∨ isHalt(s) =⇒ s .σ (c .addr).code = c .code
where isRegular(·) and isHalt(·) are predicates on execution states
indicating whether they are regular execution states or halting
states, respectively.
The consistency of annotations is preserved over execution.
Lemma B.10 (Preservation of annotation consistency). Let
s be consistent with c and Γ ⊨ sc :: S →∗ S ′ + S for some Γ, S , and S ′.
Then for all s ′c ′ ∈ S ′ it holds that s ′ is consistent with c ′.
In order to prove soundness, we will need to require a stronger
form of consistency for the execution states of c∗ that allows to
relate the contract code to the currently executed code.
Definition B.11 (Strong annotation consistency). An execution
state s is strongly consistent with contract annotation c if it is
consistent with c and additionally
isRegular(s) =⇒ s .ι.code = c .code
Contract annotations reflect the active contract that is executed.
The active account of an execution state cannot be changed during
execution. Formally, this is stated by the following lemma:
Lemma B.12 (Annotation persistence). Let Γ ⊨
S1 + sc1 :: S →∗ S2 + s ′c2 :: S . Then it holds that c1 = c2.
In order to formally state soundness, as well as some preliminary
lemmas, we need to put a minor restriction on the executions that
we are considering. This is as in the case of contract creations,
it is theoretically possible (with negligible probability) that (due
to a hash collision in the Kec (·, ·) function) a contract with the
same address as the contract c∗ under analysis is created. In this
case the contract’s storage as well as code will be overwritten.
If such an over-write would occur in the execution of c∗ (after
giving up the control flow due the call or by performing a CREATE
instruction itself), this would mean that any following execution of
c∗ would resume in the altered storage, and (even more severely)
following a new contract code. Consequently there is no way of
faithfully abstracting the execution of c∗ once the control flow was
handed over. In practice, however, the occurrence of such a hash
collision can be neglected due to its low probability. Formally, we
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give a soundness guarantee only for those executions that do not
encompass a problematic hash collision. To this end, we formally
characterize such collision-free executions:
Definition B.13 (Collision-free execution). A (n-step) execution
Γ ⊨ S →n S is collision-free for contract c∗ (written{nc∗ ) if for all
m ≤ n and all callstacks S ′′ such that Γ ⊨ S →m S ′′ it holds that
∀sc ∈ S ′′. c .addr , c∗.addr ∨ c = c∗
This definition ensures that during the execution, the address
of contract c∗ can never be attached to a different code. Given
that execution states of contract creation are annotated with (ρ,⊥)
(where ρ is the address of the contract in creation), this definition
in particular rules out that the creation code of a contract with
address c∗.addr is executed.
While the occurrences of such a colliding contract creation needs
to be excluded on executions (since it could be performed by arbi-
trary contracts), exclusion of DELEGATECALL and CALLCODE
extractions only applies to the executions of c∗ and can there-
fore be syntactically enforced on c∗’s contract code. We establish
the invariant that we obtain from excluding DELEGATECALL and
CALLCODE from c∗’s contract code:
Lemma B.14 (Annotation agreement for c∗). Let c∗ be a con-
tract such that {DELEGATECALL,CALLCODE} ∩ c∗.code = ∅. Let
further Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →∗ S ′ + S be a collision free execution for c∗ and
s be strongly consistent with c∗. Then for all (regular) execution states
s ′c ′ ∈ S ′ it holds that
(1) If c∗.addr = s ′.ι.actor then c∗.code = s ′.ι.code
(2) If c ′ , c∗ then s ′.ι.actor , c∗.addr
So, in a nutshell, for contracts not containing CALLCODE and
DELEGATECALL, strong consistency is preserved and additionally,
the contract code is persistent (cannot change over the execution).
For arguing about the call abstraction, we show the following
substantial lemma that allows us to trace back the storage of a
(contract) account to the (result of a) prior execution of this contract.
Lemma B.15 (Storage evolution). Let Γ, S , S ′, s , s ′, and c ′ , c∗
be such that s is strongly consistent with c∗ and
Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →n s ′c ′ :: S ′ + S
is a collision-free execution for c∗. Then one of the following holds:
(1) s ′ = EXC
(2) s ′ , EXC ∧
∃s∗c∗ ∈ S ′ s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s∗.σ (c∗.addr).stor
(3) s ′ , EXC ∧
∃ S∗ σ gas d ηm. |S∗ | > 0
∧ Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →m HALT(σ , gas,d,η) :: S∗ + S
∧ Γ ⊨ HALT(σ , gas,d,η) :: S∗ + S →n−m s ′c ′ :: S ′ + S
∧ s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = σ (c∗.addr).stor
This lemma allows to relate the storage of contract c∗ to prior
executions of c∗ itself. More precisely, the storage of c∗ (given that
c∗ does not contain CALLCODE or DELEGATECALL instructions)
either needs to be as it was at the point of the last call originating
from c∗ or the result of some finished prior execution of c∗.
We sketch the proof of this crucial lemma, arguing about the
most interesting cases:
Proof. (sketch) We proceed by complete induction on the num-
ber n ∈ N of small-steps.
• Case n = 0. In this case it holds that s ′c ′ = sc∗ and S ′ = ϵ .
Hence the assumption that c ′ , c∗ is trivially violated.
• Case n > 0. In this case Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →n−1 S ′′ and Γ ⊨ S ′′ →
s ′c ′ :: S ′ + S for some S ′′. We proceed by case analysis on the
small-step rule being applied in the last step.
ADD (non exception case). Then S ′′ = (µ, ι,σ ,η)c ′ :: S ′ + S for
some µ, ι, σ , and η and s ′ = (µ ′, ι,σ ,η) for some µ ′. By
inductive hypothesis for n − 1 it follows that one out of
options 1 to 3 holds for (µ, ι,σ ,η). As the global state σ
stays unaffected, this consequently also holds for (µ ′, ι,σ ,η)
hence closing the case. This reasoning applies to all local
rules that are not changing the contracts global storage (so
except for SSTORE).
SSTORE (non exception case). Then S ′′ = (µ, ι,σ ,η)c ′ :: S ′ + S for
some µ, ι, σ , and η and s ′ = (µ ′, ι,σ ′,η) for some µ ′, σ ′.
Since SSTORE only modifies the storage of the active ac-
count, we can conclude that for all addresses a such that
a , ι.actor it holds that σ (a) = σ ′(a). Since by Lemma B.14
it holds that ι.actor , c∗.addr, it particularly follows that
σ (c∗.addr) = σ ′(c∗.addr). Hence the claim follows immedi-
ately from the application of the inductive hypothesis for
n − 1.
CALL (All preconditions satisfied, called account exists). Then
S ′′ = s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ + S and S ′ = s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ for some regular
execution state s ′′, contract c ′′ and callstack S ′′. We do a
case distinction on c ′′:
c ′′ = c∗ In this case, condition 2 is satisfied since s ′′c ′′ ∈ S ′ and
the call itself does not affect the contract’s storage, so
s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s ′′.σ (c∗.addr).stor.
c ′′ , c∗ In this case the inductive hypothesis is applicable for
n − 1. Given again that the call itself does not af-
fect storage, so s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s ′′.σ (c∗.addr).stor,
the claim straightforwardly propagates to the case
of n steps. Note that similar reasoning also ap-
plies to the cases of STATICCALL, CALLCODE, and
DELEGATECALL.
Halt (return from regular halting after CALL) Then S ′′ =
HALT(σ , gas,d,η) Ûc :: s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S for some σ , gas, d , η, s ′′,
and c ′′. Additionally, it holds that s ′.σ = σ . We do a case
distinction on Ûc:
Ûc = c∗ In this case, condition 3 is satisfied since Γ ⊨
sc∗ :: S →n−1 HALT(σ , gas,d,η) Ûc :: s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S , Γ ⊨
HALT(σ , gas,d,η) Ûc :: s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S → s ′c ′ :: S ′ + S and
as s ′.σ = σ , also s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = σ (c∗.addr).stor.
Ûc , c∗ In this case again the inductive hypothesis can be ap-
plied for n − 1, and since s ′.σ = σ , the claim trivially
carries over to the case of n steps.
Exc (return from exceptional halting) Then S ′′ = EXC Ûc ::
s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S and s ′.σ = s ′′.σ (as the global state is rolled
back). By Lemma B.8, we know that there exists some
m < n − 1 such that Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →m s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S and
Γ ⊨ s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S →n−1−m EXC Ûc :: s ′′c ′ :: S ′ + S . By applying
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the inductive hypothesis form (< n), the claim straightfor-
wardly carries over to the case of n steps.
CREATE (All preconditions satisfied, created account does not exist
(no hash collision). Then S ′′ = s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ + S and S ′ =
s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ for some regular execution state s ′′, contract c ′′
and callstack S ′′. The same reasoning as for the CALL case
applies.
CREATE (All preconditions satisfied, created account exists (hash
collision). Then S ′′ = s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ + S and S ′ = s ′′c ′′ :: S ′′′ for
some regular execution state s ′′, contract c ′′ and callstack
S ′′. Additionally, we know that c ′ = (ρ,⊥) where ρ is the
newly created address. Here, we need to make use of the
assumption that the newly created address ρ is not colliding
with the address of c∗ (ρ , c∗.addr). This is ensured as
otherwise the execution would not be collision-free (for
ρ = c∗.addr the condition of Definition B.13 would be
violated for s ′c ′ ). We do a case distinction on c ′′:
c ′′ = c∗ In this case, condition 2 is satisfied since s ′′c ′′ ∈ S ′
and the contract creation does not affect the stor-
age of address c∗.addr (but only the one of ρ, which
is different by assumption). So s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor =
s ′′.σ (c∗.addr).stor.
c ′′ , c∗ In this case the inductive hypothesis is applicable
for n − 1. Given again that the contract creation
does not affect the storage of address c∗.addr, so
s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s ′′.σ (c∗.addr).stor, the claim
straightforwardly propagates to the case of n steps.
Halt (return from regular halting after CREATE) Similar to the
halting case for CALL with the only difference that instead
of s ′.σ = σ it only holds that s ′.σ = σ
〈
ρ → acc〉 for some
account state acc. However, as long as it is ensured that
ρ , c∗.addr (which is the case due to the collision-free
execution) this does not affect the reasoning.
□
Monotonicity of abstract rules. We prove separately, that all
rules in δ (c∗) are monotone (for any c∗). This facilitates the reason-
ing in the individual cases of the main proof, since it allows us to
argue about most concrete abstractions only.
Since monotoniticy is independent of the small-step semantics,
we will in the following consider an abstract semantics specified by
(D,S,Λ). First, we define monotonicity for an abstract semantics
(D,S,Λ) as follows:
Definition B.16 (Monotonicity of abstract Semantics). An abstract
semantics (D,S,Λ) is monotone if for all abstract configurations
∆I , ∆′I , ∆F ∈ AS such that ∆I ≤ ∆′I it holds that
∆I ∪ Λ ⊢ ∆F =⇒ ∃∆′F . ∆′I ∪ Λ ⊢ ∆′F ∧ ∆F ≤ ∆′F
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem B.17 (Monotonicity of δ ). For all contracts c it holds
that (Devm,Sevm,δ (c)) is monotone. (Where Devm is the super do-
main and Sevm is the signature induced by the definition in Figure 4.)
We prove this property by proving (one-step) monotonicity of
the individual rules in δ (c).
We define one-step derivations of a Horn clause H from some
abstract configuration ∆. To this end, we use the notion of a variable
assignmentV ∈ Vars → D that maps two variables to values of the
corresponding abstract domain. We write V (n(®z)) for n( ®V (z)) and
V ({ f1, . . . , fn }) for {V (f1), . . . ,V (fn )}. By V ⊨ Φ we denote that
replacing all variables in Φ according to V yields a tautology.
Definition B.18 (One-step derivability from horn clause). Let
(D,S,Λ) be an abstract semantics and (∀X . Φ, P ⇒ c) ∈ Λ. Further
let f ∈ AS Then the one-step derivability relation ⊢1 on abstract
configurations is defined as follows:
∆, (∀X . Φ, P ⇒ c) ⊢1 f := ∃V . V (P) ⊆ ∆ ∧ V ⊨ Φ ∧ f = V (c)
Note that this intuition implicitly enforces that the valuation V
respects the argument types of the predicates.
We extend the notion of derivability to sets of horn clauses and
abstract configurations:
Definition B.19 (One-step derivability from abstract semantics).
Let (D,S,Λ) be an abstract semantics. Then the one-step derivabil-
ity relation ⊢1 on Λ is defined as follows
∆,Λ ⊢1 ∆′ := ∃f . ∆ = ∆ ∪ { f } ∧ ∃H ∈ Λ. ∆,H ⊢1 f
Finally, we define ⊢ to be the reflexive, transitive closure of ⊢1.
We define the monotonicity of a Horn clause as follows:
Definition B.20 (Monotonicity of Horn clauses). Let (D,S,Λ) be
an abstract semantics. A constrained Horn clause H ∈ Λ is mono-
tone if for all ∆′ ≥ ∆
∆,H ⊢1 f =⇒ ∃f ′. ∆′,H ⊢1 f ′ ∧ f ′ ≥ f
Evidently, the (one-step) monotonicity of all Horn clauses in
an abstract semantics implies the (multi-step) monotonicity of the
abstract semantics
Lemma B.21. Let (D,S,Λ) be an abstract semantics. If all con-
strained horn clauses H ∈ Λ are monotone, then so is Λ.
It is hence sufficient to prove the (one-step) monotonicity of all
Horn clauses in (Devm,Sevm,δ (c)) (for arbitrary c).
For facilitating the proofs, we give a more syntactic characteri-
zation of Horn clause monotonicity:
Lemma B.22. Let H = ∀X . Φ, P ⇒ c be a Horn clause. If for all
variable assignments V , V ′ with (x ,D) ∈ X =⇒ V (x) ∈ D ∧
V ′(x) ∈ D it holds that
V ′(P) ≥ V (P) ∧V ⊨ Φ
=⇒ ∃V ∗. V ∗(P) = V ′(P) ∧V ∗(c) ≥ V (c) ∧V ∗ ⊨ Φ
then H is monotone.
Proof. Assume that (1)
V ′(P) ≥ V (P) ∧V ⊨ Φ
=⇒ ∃V ∗. V ∗(P) = V ′(P) ∧V ∗(c) ≥ V (c) ∧V ∗ ⊨ Φ
holds for valuations as defined above. We show the monotonicity
of H = ∀X . Φ, P ⇒ c . To this end we assume some (2) ∆ ≥ ∆
and (3) ∆,H ⊢1 f and show that there is some valuation V ′ such
that V ′(P) ⊆ ∆′, V ′ ⊨ Φ and V ′(c) ≥ f . From (3) it is known that
there is some valuation V such that V (P) ⊆ ∆, V ⊨ Φ and f = V (c).
From (2), we get that for every p ∈ V (P) there exists a p′ ∈ ∆′ such
that p ≤ p′. Given that the variables of all premises are distinct,
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we can easily construct a valuation V ′ such that V ′(q) = p for
some q ∈ P and consequently V ′(P) ⊆ ∆′ and V (P) ≤ V ′(P). Using
(1), we get that there is some V ∗ such that V ∗(P) = V ′(P) and
V ∗(c) ≥ V (c) and V ∗ ⊨ Φ. Consequently, since V ∗(P) = V ′(P) ⊆ ∆′
and V ∗(c) ≥ V (c) = f , V ∗ satisfies all required conditions. □
This lemma reduces proving monotonicity of the constrained
Horn clause to proving the monotonicity of the clause’s constraints.
Abstract operations. We exemplary show the monotonicity of
the rules shown in Figure 6. To this end we will first establish some
general monotonicity results on abstract operations.
Lemma B.23 (Monotonicity of abstract binary operations).
Let xˆ , xˆ ′, yˆ, yˆ′ such that xˆ ≤ xˆ ′ and yˆ ≤ yˆ′. Thenopbin (xˆ , yˆ) ≤Dˆ opbin (xˆ ′, yˆ′)
Lemma B.24 (Monotonicity of abstract comparison opera-
tions). Let xˆ , xˆ ′, yˆ, yˆ′ such that xˆ ≤Dˆ xˆ ′ and yˆ ≤Dˆ yˆ′. Thenopcomp (xˆ , yˆ) = 1 =⇒ opcomp (xˆ ′, yˆ′) = 1
Lemma B.25 (Monotonicity of memory access). Letm1,m2 ∈
N→ Dˆ such thatm1 ≤N→Dˆ m2 and let p ∈ N.
getWord(m1,p) ≤Dˆ getWord(m2,p)
We now give a proof sketch for Theorem B.17, illustrating the
general proof strategy.
Proof. For showing the monotonicity of δ (c∗) for arbitrary c∗ it
is sufficient to show the one-step derivability of all rules in LinstMpc
for all instructions inst and an arbitrary program counter pc. Hence,
let pc ∈ N be arbitrary. The proof proceeds by case distinction on
the instruction set.
ADD We now prove the monotonicity of the rules for addition in
Figure 6. Recall the definition of the clause for addition.
MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 1
∧ xˆ = s[size − 1] ∧ yˆ = s[size − 2]
=⇒ MStatepc+1((size − 1, s[size − 2 → xˆ +̂ yˆ]),m, stor, cℓ)
We prove the monotonicity using Lemma B.23. Assume that
there is some variable assignment satisfying the rule con-
straints, meaning that there are values (size, s),m, stor, cℓ, xˆ , yˆ
satisfying size > 1, xˆ = s[size − 1] and yˆ = s[size − 2]. We show
for any values (size′, s′) ≥N×(N→Dˆ) (size, s), m′ ≥N→Dˆ m,
stor′ ≥N→Dˆ stor, cℓ′ ≥B cℓ that there are xˆ ′, yˆ′ such that
size′ > 1, xˆ ′ = s′[size′ − 1] and yˆ′ = s′[size′ − 2], and (size −
1, s[size − 2 → xˆ +̂ yˆ]) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size′ − 1, s′[size′ − 2 →
xˆ ′ +̂ yˆ′]). First we observe that size = size′ and (since
(size, s) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size′, s′)). We pick xˆ ′ = s′[size − 1] and
yˆ′ = s′[size−2] and from (size, s) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size′, s′)we know
that s[size − 1] ≤Dˆ s′[size − 1] and s[size − 2] ≤Dˆ s′[size − 2],
so consequently also xˆ ≤Dˆ xˆ ′ and yˆ ≤Dˆ yˆ′. So we are left to
show that (size − 1, s[size − 2 → xˆ +̂ yˆ]) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size′ −
1, s′[size − 2 → xˆ ′ +̂ yˆ′]). Since (size, s) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size′, s′),
we only need to show that xˆ +̂ yˆ ≤Dˆ xˆ ′ +̂ yˆ′ which immediately
follows from Lemma B.23.
MLOAD Recall the definition of the rule for addition:
MStatepc((size, s),m, stor, cℓ) ∧ size > 1
∧ oˆ = s[size − 1] ∧ vˆ = (oˆ ∈ N) ? getWord(m, oˆ) : ⊤
=⇒ MStatepc+1((size, s[size − 1 → vˆ]),m, stor, cℓ)
We prove the monotonicity using Lemma B.23. Assume
that there is some variable assignment satisfying the rule
constraints, meaning that there are values (size, s), m, stor,
cℓ, oˆ, vˆ satisfying size > 0, oˆ = s[size − 1], and vˆ =
(oˆ ∈ N) ? getWord(m, oˆ) : ⊤. We show for any values
(size′, s′) ≥N×(N→Dˆ) (size, s),m′ ≥N→Dˆ m, stor′ ≥N→Dˆ stor,
cℓ′ ≥B cℓ that there are oˆ′, vˆ ′ such that size′ > 1, oˆ′ =
s′[size′ − 1] and vˆ ′ = (oˆ′ ∈ N) ? getWord(m, oˆ′) : ⊤, and
s[size − 1 → vˆ] ≤N×(N→Dˆ) s′[size′ − 1 → vˆ ′]. First we ob-
serve size = size′ and cℓ = cℓ′. We pick oˆ′ = s′[size′ − 1]
and vˆ ′ = (oˆ′ ∈ N) ? getWord(m′, oˆ′) : ⊤. We know that
s[size − 1] ≤Dˆ s′[size′ − 1] since (size′, s′) ≥N×(N→Dˆ) (size, s)
and hence also oˆ ≤Dˆ oˆ′. For showing that (size, s[size − 1 →
vˆ]) ≤N×(N→Dˆ) (size, s′[size′ − 1 → vˆ ′]) it is sufficient to show
that vˆ ≤Dˆ vˆ ′. We make a case distinction on oˆ ∈ N
oˆ ∈ N In this case vˆ = getWord(m, oˆ). Since oˆ ≤Dˆ oˆ′ we know that
either oˆ′ = oˆ or oˆ′ = ⊤.
oˆ′ = oˆ In this case clearly oˆ′ ∈ N and hence vˆ ′ =
getWord(m′, oˆ′). Since m ≤N→Dˆ m′, we know from
Lemma B.25 that getWord(m, oˆ) ≤Dˆ getWord(m′, oˆ′)
and hence vˆ ≤Dˆ vˆ ′.
oˆ′ = ⊤ In this case vˆ ′ = ⊤. Since ⊤ is the top element of Dˆ
(Lemma B.4), trivially vˆ ≤Dˆ vˆ ′.
oˆ = ⊤ In this case vˆ = ⊤ and since oˆ ≤Dˆ oˆ′ also oˆ′ = ⊤ and hence
vˆ ′ = ⊤ and consequently vˆ ≤Dˆ vˆ ′.
□
Soundness of abstract operations. In addition to their mono-
tonicity, we are also interested in the soundness of abstract oper-
ations. Intuitively, an abstract operation is sound, if its result is
at least as abstract than the result of the concrete operation We
formally state soundness for binary operations and comparison
operations.
Lemma B.26 (Soundness of abstract binary operations). Let
x ,y ∈ N. Then
opbin(x ,y) ≤Dˆ opbin (x ,y)
Lemma B.27 (Soundness of abstract comparison operations).
Let x ,y ∈ N. Then
opcomp(x ,y) = 1 =⇒ opcomp (x ,y) = 1
That the memory access is sound, is captured by the following
lemma:
Lemma B.28 (Soundness of memory access). Letm ∈ N→ N
and p ∈ N.
m(p) ≤Dˆ getWord(toWordMem(m),p)
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Main Proof.We slightly refine Theorem 3.1 to consider collision-
free executions of c∗, a detail that we omitted in the original for-
mulation for the sake of presentation.
Theorem (Soundness). Let c∗ be a contract whose code does
not contain DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE. Let Γ be a transaction
environment and let S and S ′ be annotated callstacks such that |S ′ | >
0. Then for all execution states s that are strongly consistent with c∗
such that Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →∗ S ′ + S is a collision-free execution, it holds
that
∀∆I . αc∗ ([sc∗ ]) ≤ ∆I =⇒ ∃∆. ∆I ,δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆ ∧ αc∗ (S ′) ≤ ∆
We will give a proof sketch for the most interesting cases of the
soundness proof, providing formal arguments for the soundness
of local operations as well as transaction-initiating instructions. In
particular, the proof details out the correctness argument for the
abstractions of the CALL rule by covering call initiation as well as
returning from contracts calls.
Proof. (sketch) By complete induction on the numbern of small-
steps.
• Case n = 0. In the case of the empty reduction sequence, we
have that S ′ = [sc∗ ] and consequently the claim trivially follows
by the reflexivity of ⊢.
• Case n > 0. Let Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →n−1 S ′′ and Γ ⊨ S ′′ → S ′ + S .
By Lemma B.5, it holds that S ′′ = S∗ + S for some S∗ with
|S∗ | > 0. By the inductive hypothesis we know that for all ∆I ≥
αc∗ ([sc∗ ]) there is some ∆S∗ ≥ αc∗ (S∗) such that ∆I ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢
∆S∗ . Consequently, for proving the claim, it is sufficient to show
that there is some ∆S ′ ≥ αc∗ (S ′) such that ∆S∗∪δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆S ′ . As
|S∗ | > 0, we know that S∗ = s ′c ′ :: S∗∗ for some execution state
s ′, contract c ′ and callstack S∗∗. The proof is by case analysis
on the rule applied in the last reduction step. We show here
exemplary the cases for arithmetic operations as well as the
rule for calling.
ADD (non exception case). Then s ′ = (µ, ι,σ ,η), ι.code [µ .pc] =
ADD and S ′ = (µ ′, ι,σ ,η)c ′ :: S∗∗. We distinguish the two
cases on whether the top stack element s ′c ′ is translated
or not (c ′ = c∗)
c ′ , c∗ In this case αc∗ (S∗) = αc∗ (S∗∗). As ADD is a local in-
struction, we know that S ′ = s ′′c ′ :: S∗∗ and hence also
αc∗ (S ′) = αc∗ (S∗∗). The claim hence follows trivially
from the reflexivity of ⊢. The same reasoning applies
to all other local instructions.
c ′ = c∗ In this case αc∗ (S∗) = αs (s ′, c∗.addr, cℓ) ∪ αc∗ (S∗∗) for
some cℓ ∈ B. As s ′ is strongly consistent with c∗ (by
Lemma B.14), we know that ι.code = c∗.code and hence
δ (c∗) ⊇ LADDMµ .pc. The claim then follows from the
monotonicity of δ (c∗) (Theorem B.17) and the sound-
ness of abstract addition (Lemma B.26). The same ar-
gumentation applies to all other local operations.
CALL (all preconditions satisfied, called account exists). Then s ′ =
(µ, ι,σ ,η), ι.code [µ .pc] = CALL and S ′ = (µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η) Ûc :: S∗
such that µ ′ is initial, and σ (a).stor = σ ′(a).stor for all
addresses a. Again we distinguish the cases whether the
newly pushed callstack element (µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η) Ûc is abstracted
by α or not.
Ûc , c∗ Then αc∗ (S ′) = αc∗ (S∗) and the claim trivially holds.
Ûc = c∗ We do another case distinction on whether c ′ = c∗
c ′ = c∗ In this case, we know that αs (s ′, addr.c∗, cℓ) ≤ ∆S∗
(where cℓ = (S∗∗ , ϵ)). Since s ′ is strongly
consistent with c∗ (by Lemma B.14), we
have that ι.code = c∗.code and henceLCALLMµ .pc ⊆ δ (c∗). Since s ′ is a call state,
we have that LCALLMµ .pc ∪ αs (s ′, addr.c∗, cℓ) ⊢
{MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ (c∗.addr).stor, 1)}.
As µ ′ is initial and σ (a).stor =
σ ′(a).stor, we know additionally that
{MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ (c∗.addr).stor, 1)} =
αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, cℓ′) (for cℓ′ = (S∗ , ϵ)).
By the monotonicity of δ (c∗) (Theo-
rem B.17), we know that there is also some
∆x ≥ αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, cℓ′) such that
∆S∗ ,δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆x which concludes the proof since
∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆x ∪ ∆S∗
≥ αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, cℓ′) ∪ α(S∗)
= α(S ′)
c ′ , c∗ By Lemma B.15, we know (since s ′ is a
regular execution state) that either (1)
there exists some s∗c∗ ∈ S∗∗ such that
s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s∗.σ (c∗.addr).stor or (2) there
exist S†, σ ∗, gas∗, d∗, η∗, andm < n such that Γ ⊨
sc∗ :: S →m HALT(σ ∗, gas∗,d∗,η∗)c∗ :: S† + S and
Γ ⊨ HALT(σ ∗, gas∗,d∗,η∗)c∗ :: S† + S →n−1−m
(µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η) Ûc :: s ′c ′ :: S∗∗ + S and
s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor. Addi-
tionally, we know that then σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor =
σ ′(c∗.addr).stor. We make a distinction on the
previously mentioned cases:
(1) In this case we know that
αs (s∗, c∗.addr, cℓ∗) ⊆ αc∗ (S∗∗) = αc∗ (S∗)
for some cℓ∗ ∈ B. Since, we know that
s∗ is a call state (Lemma B.7), we know
that s∗ = (µ∗, ι∗,σ ∗,η∗) for some µ∗,
ι∗, σ ∗, and η∗ such that the conditions
in Definition B.6 are satisfied. Since s∗
is a call state, ι∗.code[µ∗.pc] = CALL11.
As s∗ is strongly consistent with c∗ (by
Lemma B.14), also ι∗.code = c∗.code and
hence δ (c∗) ⊇ LCALLMpc∗ . In particu-
lar, the second abstract CALL rule (C2)
is applicable on αs (s∗, c∗.addr, cℓ∗) ⊆
αc∗ (S∗∗) and hence one can derive
MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor, 1).
Additionally, we have that
αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, (S∗ , ϵ)) =
MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ ′(c∗.addr).stor, 1)
(since, µ ′ is an initial machine state
and S∗ is non-empty). Together with
11This is a simplifying assumption made here. Actually ι∗ .code[µ∗ .pc] ∈
{CALL, STATICCALL, CREATE}. Since, the abstract semantics of these instructions
have the same rules (up to minor differences in the preconditions of calling), exactly
the same argumentation applies as shown here for the case of CALL.
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s ′.σ (c∗.addr).stor = s∗.σ (c∗.addr).stor and
σ (a).stor = σ ′(a).stor for all a (since the call
rule does not effect a contract’s storage), we
can conclude that αs (s∗, c∗.addr, cℓ∗)∪δ (c∗) ⊢
αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, 1). Due to the mono-
tonicity of δ (c∗) (Theorem B.17), we know that
there is some ∆i ≥ αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, 1),
such that ∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆i (since
∆S∗∗ ≥ α(S∗∗) ⊇ αs (s∗, c∗.addr, cℓ∗).
Consequently:
∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆S∗ ∪ ∆i
≥ α(S∗) ∪ αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, 1)
= α((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η) :: S∗)
= α(S ′)
(2) In this case, we get from the induc-
tive hypothesis for m (since m < n)
that there exists some ∆H such that
∆H ≥ α(HALT(σ ∗, gas∗,d∗,η∗)c∗ :: S†)
and ∆I ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆H , and addition-
ally |S† | > 0. Consequently also
∆H ≥ {Halt(σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor, 1)} ∪ α(S†)
Additionally we know that S∗∗ = S1 + [s1c∗ ]
for some S1 and some s1 from Lemma B.12
(since the first state on top of S needs to
be annotated with c∗). Additionally we can
conclude from Lemma B.7 that s1 is a call
state. From Lemma B.14, we know that s1
is strongly consistent with c∗ and hence
s1.ι.code = c∗.code. As s1 is a call state,
hence also c∗.code[s1.µ .pc] = CALL and
consequently δ (c∗) ⊇ LCALLMs1 .µ .pc12. In ad-
dition we have that αs (s1, c∗.addr, 0) ≤ ∆S∗∗
and since s1 is a call state all pre con-
ditions of rule C3 in LCALLMs1 .µ .pc are
satisfied. More precisely αs (s1, c∗.addr, (S† ,
ϵ)) ∪ δ (c∗) ∪ {Halt(σ (c∗.addr).stor, 1)} ⊢
{MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor, 1)}
(since |S† | > 0). By the monotonic-
ity of δ (c∗) (Theorem B.17) hence
there is some ∆x such that ∆x ≥
{MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ (c∗.addr).stor, 1)}
and ∆H ∪ ∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆x . Since
σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor = σ ′(c∗.addr).stor and
as (µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η) is an initial state we know
that αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, (S∗ , ϵ)) =
{MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,σ ∗(c∗.addr).stor, 1)}
which concludes the proof since
∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆S∗ ∪ ∆H ∪ δ (c∗)
⊢ ∆S∗ ∪ ∆x
≥ α(S∗) ∪ αs ((µ ′, ι′,σ ′,η), c∗.addr, (S∗ , ϵ))
= α(S ′)
12See Footnote 11
Halt (returning from regular halting). Then s ′ =
HALT(σ ′,η′, gas′,d ′), S∗∗ = s ′′c ′′ :: S† and S ′ = s ′′′c ′′ :: S†.
We make a case distinction on c ′′ = c∗:
c ′′ , c∗ In this case clearly α(S∗) ⊇ α(S†) and α(S ′) = α(S†)
and consequently ∆S ′ ≥ α(S ′) and hence the claim
trivially follows by the reflexivity of ⊢.
c ′′ = c∗ In this case α(S∗) ⊇ αs (s ′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) ∪ α(S†) and
α(S ′) = αs (s ′′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′)∪α(S†). From Lemma B.7,
we know that s ′′ is a call state. With Lemma B.14,
we additionally have that s ′′.ι.code = c∗.code
and hence also c∗.code[s ′′.µ .pc] = CALL13.
Consequently δ (c∗) ⊇ LCALLMs ′′ .µ .pc. In addi-
tion we have that αs (s ′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) ≤ ∆S∗
and since s ′′ is a call state, all preconditions
of rule Equation (C1) in LCALLMs ′′ .µ .pc are sat-
isfied. More precisely αs (s ′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) ∪
δ (c∗) ⊢ MStates′′ .µ .pc+1 ((|s ′′.µ .s| −
6, stackToArray(s ′′.µ .s)[|s ′′.µ .s| − 7 →
⊤]), λx .⊤, λx .⊤) = p. We know additionally
that αs (s ′′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) = MStates′′′ .µ .pc ((|s ′′′.µ .s|,
stackToArray(s ′′′.µ .s)), toWordMem(s ′′′.µ .m),
s ′′′.µ .σ (c∗.addr).stor) Since s ′′′.µ .pc = s ′′.µ .pc + 1,
|s ′′′.µ .s| = |s ′′.µ .s| − 6 and for all i ∈
{0, . . . , |s ′′.µ .s| − 8} we have s ′′.µ .s[i] = s ′′.µ .s[i],
it holds that p ≥ αs (s ′′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) (since λx .⊤
is the top element for mappings f ∈ N → Dˆ
and ⊤ ≥ s ′′′.µ .s[0], cf. Lemma B.4). So since
α(S∗) ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ p there is by the monotonicity of δ (c∗)
(Theorem B.17) some ∆p such that ∆S∗ ∪ δc∗ ⊢ ∆p and
∆p ≥ p. Consequently we can conclude the proof:
∆S∗ ∪ δ (c∗) ⊢ ∆p ∪ ∆S∗
≥ {p} ∪ α(S∗)
≥ αs (s ′′′, c∗.addr, cℓ′′) ∪ α(S†)
= α(S ′)
The same arguments apply for returning from exceptional
halting.
□
C CHECKING SECURITY PROPERTIES WITH
ETHOR
In this section, we discuss how the security properties presented
in § 2.3 are implemented in eThor using HoRSt. In particular, we
explain how reachability properties can be abstracted as queries
using the example of the call reachability property. Afterwards ,
we illustrate the infrastructure for proving functional correctness
queries as well as the one for automated soundness and precision
testing.
C.1 From reachability properties to queries
All reachability properties introduced in § 3.5 can be seen as in-
stances of properties of the following form:
R(P, R) := ∀s . P ([s]) =⇒ ¬∃S ′, Γ ⊨ sc∗ :: S →∗ S ′ + S ∧ R(S ′)
13See Footnote 11
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where s is assumed to be strongly consistent with c∗ and S ′ is
assumed to be non-empty. We will refer to properties of this form
in the following as unreachability properties.
For the sake of presentation, we will in the following inter-
pret predicates P ,R as the sets of those elements satisfying these
predicates. Additionally, we will overload the abstraction function
α to operate on sets of configurations hence writing αc∗ (R) for⋃
S ′∈R αc∗ (S ′) and αc∗ (P) for
⋃
[sc∗ ]∈P αc∗ ([sc∗ ]).
Following Theorem 3.1 for proving such properties it is sufficient
to give some set ∆P such that ∆P ≥ αc∗ (P) and to show, for any set
∆R over-approximating αc∗ (R) that ∆P ̸⊢ ∆R . Instead of showing
this property for all possible sets ∆R , it is sufficient to find a query
set ∆query that shares at least one element with all possible sets ∆R :
∀∆R . ∆R ≥ αc∗ (R) =⇒ ∆R ∩ ∆query , ∅ (7)
Proving ∆R ,δ (c∗) ̸⊢ ∆query then implies that R(P ,R) holds.
Under certain conditions, such a set can be easily constructed
from R as follows:
∆query(R) := {p′ | ∃p . p ∈ αc∗ (R) ∧ p ≤p p′ } (8)
Intuitively, it is sufficient to query for the most concrete abstraction
(as given by α∗c ) of the concrete configurations in R and all predicate-
wise (≤p ) coarser abstractions of those. The set ∆query(R) however
is only a valid query set for R if for some S ′ ∈ R it holds that
αc∗ (S ′) is non-empty. Otherwise Equation (7) is trivially violated.
Intuitively this means that that only postconditions R that make
some restrictions on those callstack components that are modeled
by the analysis (namely executions of contract c∗) can be reasonably
analyzed using this technique. We formally state this property in
the following lemma:
Lemma C.1. Let Ss ⊆ C × C be a small step semantics and
(D,S,α ,Λ) a sound abstraction thereof. Furthermore let P , R ⊆ C
be predicates on configurations and ∆P be an abstract configuration
such that ∆P ≥ α(P). Then if there is some c ′ ∈ R such that α(c ′) , ∅
it holds that
∆P , Λ ̸⊢ ∆query(R) =⇒ R(P, R)
As a consequence, it is generally sufficient to query for the reach-
ability of ∆query(R) in order to prove an unreachability property
R(P ,R).
We will next show how this theoretical result can be used in
practice and in particular at the level of HoRSt.
Initialization. For checking an unreachability property R(P ,R),
we need to show the non-derivability of a valid query set ∆query
from some abstract configuration ∆P ≥ α(P). Hence we need to
axiomatize such an abstract configuration ∆P . This can be easily
done inHoRSt by providing rules having true as a single premise. For
axiomatizing that the execution starts in an initial machine state
as required for the call unreachability property defined in Defini-
tion 3.2 we can add the following rule to the analysis specification:
1 rule initOp :=
2 clause
3 true => MState {0}(0, [@V(0)], [@V(0)], [@T], false);
As the precondition P of the call unreachability property requires
the top state s (that also serves as the zero-bar for the call level) to
be initial, α(s) can contain only predicate applications of the form
MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0,m, 0) wherem is some memory mapping.
However, λx .⊤ (corresponding to [@T]) over-approximates all mem-
ory arrays and hence ∆P = {MState0((0, λx . 0), λx . 0, λx .⊤, 0)} ≥
α(P).
Queries. In addition to syntax for writing an analysis specification,
HoRSt also provides mechanisms for the interaction with the under-
lying SMT-solver. More precisely it supports syntax for specifying
queries and tests. Syntactically, queries consist of a list of premises
(as in a clause). A query leads to the invocation of the SMT solver
to test whether conjunction of those premises is derivable from the
given initialization using the specified rules. The query will result
in SAT in case that all premises are derivable and in UNSAT in case
that the conjunction of premises can be proven to be non-derivable.
In order to check for reachability of abstract configurations,
HoRSt allows for the specification of (reachability) queries that can
also be generated from selector functions. The query shown in
Figure 15 for instance checks for reentrancy by checking if any
CALL instruction is reachable at call level 114. It therefore is an
implementation of the reachability property introduced in § 3.5.
This query can be obtained from the call unreachability property
defined in Definition 3.2 which is of the form R(P ,R) with R :=
{sc∗ :: S ′ | |S ′ | > 0 ∧ c∗.code[s, µ .pc] ∈ Instcall}. Intuitively, we can
split this property into a set of different properties R(P ,Ri ) where
i ranges over the set of CALL instructions in c∗. More precisely, let
Ri := {sc∗ :: S ′ | |S ′ | > 0 ∧ s, µ .pc = i} then it holds that
R(P, R) ⇔ ∀i ∈ {i | c∗ .code[i] ∈ Instcall }. R(P, Ri )
Then each instance of the reentrancyCall query specifies one query set
∆iquery that satisfies Equation (7) for Ri . Hence showing the underiv-
ability of all those sets from ∆P proves the claim. Intuitively, ∆iquery
satisfies Equation (7) for Ri because α∗c (Ri ) contains an application
of a predicateMStatei with argument cℓ = 1 and so it needs to con-
tain all abstractions of ∆Ri ≥ α∗c (Ri ) as the cℓ component ranging
over B cannot further be abstracted. Consequently, the set ∆iquery,
which contains all predicates of that form, has a trivial intersection
with ∆Ri .
C.2 Functional correctness
For checking functional correctness, some modifications to the
abstract semantics are necessary.
This is as the different contract executions need to be bound the
the corresponding input data of the call and since we want to reason
about return data. We will in the following shortly overview the
relevant changes and motivate that similar modifications can easily
be incorporated for reasoning about other dependencies with the
execution or blockchain environment. We will present the relevant
modifications in HoRSt syntax so that the explanations serve as a
guide to the enhanced version of the semantics [6].
First, the relevant predicates need to be enriched with a corre-
sponding representation of the call data. We decided to represent
call data as a word array with the particularity that the array’s first
element represents only 4 bytes. This is due to the call conventions
enforced by the Solidity compiler which interpret the first 4 bytes of
input data as the hash of the called function’s signature to properly
14To be fully correct there are also corresponding queries for the other relevant call
instructions CREATE and STATICCALL.
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dispatch function calls. In addition to the call data, we introduce a
new predicate representing the return data of a call.
Formally, we arrive at the following predicate definitions:
1 datatype CallData := @D<int*array <AbsDom >>;
2 pred MState{int*int}: int * array <AbsDom > * array <AbsDom > *
array <AbsDom > * bool * CallData;
3 pred Exc{int}: bool;
4 pred Halt{int}: array <AbsDom > * AbsDom * bool * CallData;
5 pred ReturnData{int}: int * AbsDom * bool * CallData;
Note that we represent call data as a tuple of its size and an array
of abstract words. Also, we added to the Halt predicate an argument
representing the return data size. This argument stems from the
abstract domain with @T indicating that the concrete size of the
return data is unknown. The ReturnData predicate maps the positions
of the return data (word) array to the corresponding values that it
holds.
The existing rules simply propagate the the call data array with
the only addition that the CALLDATALOAD instruction now ac-
cesses the call data array instead of over-approximating the loaded
value. The new rule for CALLDATALOAD is depicted in Figure 16.
The CALLDATALOAD operation takes as argument a value from
the stack that specifies the byte position starting from which one
word of the call data byte array shall be loaded (to the stack). The
rule is split into two clauses for taking advantage of the pre-analysis.
More precisely, in case that the position of call data to is known up-
front, the call data array ?call can be assessed more precisely. Since
we model the call data as a word instead of a byte array (similar
to our memory abstraction), either a word loaded from it consists
of a full word in the word array or needs to be composed out of
two neighboring words. Composing to integers (interpreting them
as byte arrays) however requires exponentiation as defined in the
append function in § B.2. z3 is not able to handle general exponen-
tiation - for this reason we can only compute such exponentiations
(by unfolding to multiplications) whose exponent is known upfront.
Consequently, the first rule in Figure 16 handles the case where the
argument to the call is known upfront: the accessWordCallData function
expects the position as a parameter and computes the accessed
word precisely from the call data array since exponentiation can
be unrolled. The second rule handles the case where the argument
to the call is not known upfront. In case that during the analysis
it can be detected to be concrete (by the function isConcrete), the
accessWordCalldataEven function is used to access the call data at the cor-
responding position. This function however only yields a precise
result in case that the provided position corresponds to the begin-
ning of a word in the calldata array, otherwise it over-approximates
the result as T.
The ReturnData predicate is inhabited by the rules that model regu-
lar halting. We exemplarily show the rule of the RETURN opcode
depicted in Figure 17.
The RETURN instruction in EVM reads a memory offset and
length from the stack and returns the corresponding memory frag-
ment as byte array. In our abstraction the return data is modeled
by an own predicate that holds words instead of bytes. This design
choice follows the one made for the word-indexed memory and
the call data array which hold words instead of bytes as well for
performance reasons. The RETURN semantics is closely reflected
in the abstract RETURN rule: the first clause of the rule inhabits
the Halt predicate, reading the size of the return data from the stack.
The next three clauses inhabit the ReturnData predicate, differentiating
depending on how much information on the return data (size and
memory offset) are known: If both memory offset and length of the
data are known, for each word position ?p the corresponding mem-
ory word is read from the memory array ?mem (using the function
accesswordMemoryEven) and written into the ReturnData predicate. The next
clause describes the case where the memory offset is unknown,
but the size of the return data is known. In this case we cannot
know which (concrete values) form the return data, but can only
approximate all possible return data words (as determined by the
size of the array) with @T. The last clause covers the case where the
length of the return data is not known. Since it is fully unclear in
this case whether data should be returned in the first place (since
the length could be 0), all potential positions of the return data
array are over-approximated by @T.
Finally, the functional correctness queries for the addition func-
tion of the SafeMath library can be posed as follows:
1 op callAdd(x: int , y: int): CallData :=
2 @D(68, store (store (store [@T] 0 @V (1997931255)) 1 (@V(x))) 2
(@V(y)));
3
4
5 test addOverflowNoHalt expect UNSAT
6 for (!id: int) in ids()
7 [?x:int , ?y: int , ?z:int , ?p:int , ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?
rdsize:AbsDom]
8 ?x >= 0,
9 ?y >= 0,
10 ?x < MAX ,
11 ?y < MAX ,
12 ?x + ?y >= MAX ,
13 Halt{!id}(?stor , ?rdsize , false , callAdd (?x, ?y));
14
15 test addNoOverflowCorrect expect SAT
16 for (!id: int) in ids()
17 [?res: AbsDom , ?x:int , ?y: int , ?z:int , ?rdsize:AbsDom , ?
stor: array <AbsDom >]
18 ?x >= 0,
19 ?y >= 0,
20 ?x + ?y < MAX ,
21 ReturnData {!id}(0, ?res , false , callAdd (?x, ?y)),
22 Halt{!id}(?stor , ?rdsize , false , callAdd (?x, ?y)),
23 abseq(?rdsize , @V(32)),
24 abseq(?res , @V(?x + ?y));
25
26 test addNoOverflowHalt expect UNSAT
27 for (!id: int) in ids()
28 [?res: AbsDom , ?x:int , ?y: int , ?z:int , ?rdsize: AbsDom ,
?stor: array <AbsDom >]
29 ?x >= 0,
30 ?y >= 0,
31 ?x + ?y < MAX ,
32 Halt{!id}(?stor , ?rdsize , false , callAdd (?x, ?y)),
33 ?rdsize != @V(32);
34
35 test addNoOverflowUnique expect UNSAT
36 for (!id: int) in ids()
37 [?res: AbsDom , ?x:int , ?y: int , ?z:int , ?rdsize: AbsDom ,
?stor: array <AbsDom >]
38 ?x >= 0,
39 ?y >= 0,
40 ?x + ?y < MAX ,
41 ReturnData {!id}(0, ?res , false , callAdd (?x, ?y)),
42 ?res != @V(?x + ?y);
We first specify the call data for a call to the add function of
the SafeMath library as an operation callAdd returning an CallData
element when being provided with the arguments to the call. Since
the add function expects 2 integer arguments the callAdd function
return a call data of size 68 (4 + 2 ∗ 32) bytes) where the a T array is
initialized with the hash of the corresponding function signature as
first element (which represents the first 4 bytes of the call data) and
the arguments x and y as following to elements. Note that the hash of
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1 rule opCallDataLoad :=
2 for (!id: int) in ids(), (!pc: int) in pcsForIdAndOpcode (!id, CALLDATALOAD), (!a: int) in argumentsOneForIdAndPc (!id, !pc)
3 clause [?x: AbsDom , ?size: int , ?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?cl: bool , ?p: int , ?v: AbsDom , ?cdata:
CallData]
4 MState {!id, !pc}(?size , ?sa , ?mem , ?stor , ?cl, ?cdata), ?size > 0,
5 !a != ~1, // in case that the position could be pre -computed , use it for accessing the position more precisely
6 ?v = accessWordCalldata {!a}(? cdata) // accesses word at the corresponding position of the call data
7 => MState {!id, !pc +1}(?size , store ?sa (?size -1) (?v), ?mem , ?stor , ?cl, ?cdata),
8 clause [?x: AbsDom , ?size: int , ?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?cl: bool , ?cdata: CallData , ?p: int , ?v:
AbsDom]
9 MState {!id, !pc}(?size , ?sa , ?mem , ?stor , ?cl , ?cdata), ?size > 0,
10 !a = ~1, // if the argument could not be preecomputed , extract the argument from stack
11 ?x = select ?sa (?size - 1),
12 ?v = (isConcrete (?x)) ? (accessWordCalldataEven(extractConcrete (?x), ?cdata)) : (@T) // if the offset is concrete , try to access the
word at the given position. This will only result in a concrete result if the value is a word position
13 => MState {!id, !pc +1}(?size , store ?sa (?size -1) (?v), ?mem , ?stor , ?cl, ?cdata);
Figure 16: Rule for CALLDATALOAD in the enhanced abstract semantics.
1 rule opHaltOnReturn :=
2 for (!id: int) in ids(), (!pc: int) in pcsForIdAndOpcode (!id, RETURN)
3 let
4 macro #StackSizeCheck := MState {!id ,!pc}(?size , ?sa, ?mem , ?stor , ?cl, ?cdata), ?size > 1
5 in
6 clause [?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?size:int , ?cl: bool , ?cdata: CallData , ?length: AbsDom]
7 #StackSizeCheck ,
8 ?length = select ?sa (?size -2)
9 => Halt{!id}(?stor , ?length , ?cl, ?cdata),
10 clause [?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?size:int , ?cl: bool , ?offset: AbsDom , ?length: AbsDom , ?o:
int , ?l:int , ?p:int , ?v: AbsDom , ?cdata: CallData]
11 #StackSizeCheck ,
12 ?offset = select ?sa (?size -1), // select top values on the stack
13 ?length = select ?sa (?size -2),
14 isConcrete (? offset),
15 isConcrete (? length),
16 ?o = extractConcrete (? offset),
17 ?l = extractConcrete (? length),
18 ?p >= 0,
19 (?p * 32) < ?l, // write all words that are still within the length
20 ?v = accessWordMemoryEven (?o + ?p, ?mem)
21 => ReturnData {!id}(?p, ?v, ?cl, ?cdata), // careful: the Return data predicate is also inhabited in words!
22 clause [?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?size:int , ?cl: bool , ?offset: AbsDom , ?length: AbsDom , ?o:
int , ?l:int , ?p:int , ?v: AbsDom , ?cdata: CallData]
23 #StackSizeCheck ,
24 ?offset = select ?sa (?size -1), // select top values on the stack
25 ?length = select ?sa (?size -2),
26 ~isConcrete (? offset), // if we don 't know the offset , but only the length , we write top at the places in the specified range
27 isConcrete (? length),
28 ?l = extractConcrete (? length),
29 ?p >= 0,
30 ?p * 32 < ?l
31 => ReturnData {!id}(?p, @T , ?cl, ?cdata),
32 clause [?sa: array <AbsDom >, ?mem: array <AbsDom >, ?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?size:int , ?cl: bool , ?offset: AbsDom , ?length: AbsDom , ?o:
int , ?l:int , ?p:int , ?v: AbsDom , ?cdata: CallData]
33 #StackSizeCheck ,
34 ?length = select ?sa (?size -2),
35 ~isConcrete (? length),
36 ?p >= 0
37 => ReturnData {!id}(?p, @T, ?cl, ?cdata);
Figure 17: Rule for RETURN in the enhanced abstract semantics.
the function signature and its hash is provided by Solidity compilers
via the so called Ethereum Contract ABI (Contract Application
Binary Interface). In the future we plan to automatically generate
an infrastructure for functional correctness queries on Solidity
contracts from the contract’s ABI. The first functional correctness
test addOverflowNoHalt requires that it is impossible to reach a Halt state
(which indicates regular halting) from a call to to the add function
in case that the summands ?x and ?y provided as arguments produce
an overflow.
The second functional correctness test (addNoOverflowCorrect) checks
whether it is possible (in case that no overflow occurs) to compute
the expected result (or an over-approximation thereof) in the first
place. Here abseq is the function implementing an equality test on
the abstract domain, hence considering every concrete element to
be potentially equal to @T. By the soundness of the analysis, if this
query would turn out to be unsatisfiable, it would be impossible
for the function to produce the correct result under any circum-
stances. This query of course does not prove that the function will
always provide a result: This indeed is and should not be provable,
since any smart contract can always halt exceptionally when run-
ning out of gas. This test case serves as a sanity check that only
becomes meaningful in conjunction with the following tests. The
third and fourth functional correctness tests (addNoOverflowHalt and
addNoOverflowUnique) prove that given non-overflowing arguments, if
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the function execution halts successfully, nothing but the correct
result can be produced. In other words, it is impossible to halt
successfully without producing the correct result. This property
is composed out of two queries since it needs to be shown that 1)
It is impossible for the function to halt without returning a result
of length 32 (corresponding to one word) as recorded in the Halt
predicate and 2) It is impossible that the actual return value (as
recorded in the ReturnData predicate) differs from the sum of the two
arguments.
The functional correctness tests for the other functions of the
SafeMath library follow the same pattern.
C.3 Automated Testing in HoRSt
The setup for automated testing (see § 5.3) shown in Figure 18
presents a use case for the Hoare-Logic-style reasoning capabili-
ties of eThor and furthermore provides us with the opportunity to
showcase some further features of HoRSt.
We first shortly overview the form of the test cases in the official
EVM test suite: Test cases come in two flavors: the first group
consists of 490 test cases specifying a storage configuration as
postcondition, the second group, consisting of 108 test cases, lacks
a post condition (which we interpreted as requiring an exceptional
halt).
To account for this test structure we declare four additional selec-
tor functions: The selector functions preStorageForId and postStorageForId
provide tuples of storage offsets and values which specify the
storage contents before and after the execution of the contract.
emptyListIfNoPostConditionForId and dummyListIfNoPostConditionForId generate
an empty list, respectively a list with one element, depending on if
there is a postcondition specified or not. Since rules are generated
for the cross product of their selector functions return values, we
can use these functions to generate different rules for different test
cases while still using the same HoRSt inputs.
The rule for initialization, initOp, differs in one value from the
definition used in the other experiments. In line 11, we populate
an array with the values returned by preStorageForId, starting from an
array containing only zeroes.
In case we want to check for the reachability of a certain stor-
age configuration, we generate the two queries correctValues and
uniqueValues. correctValues is successful, if a Halt predicate is reachable
whose storage contains 1) values abstractly equal to the values re-
turned by postStorageForId at the offsets returned by postStorage and
2) a value abstractly equal to 0 for all offsets not returned by
postStorageForId. uniqueValues is successful, if no Halt predicate is reach-
able whose storage contains any value abstractly unequal to the
values returned by postStorageForId. This is only the case, if every
value in the memory is concrete. Summing up, such a test case
is considered to be solved correctly if correctValues is successful and
considered to be solved precisely if correctValues and uniqueValues are
successful.
In case we want to check for exceptional halting, we just query
for the unreachability of a regular Halt predicate (see irregularHalt).
Such a query is considered solved precisely on success and impre-
cisely on failure, since reaching additional program states (Halt in
this instance), which are not reachable in the concrete execution, is
a sign of over-approximation.
D SOUNDNESS ISSUES IN RELATEDWORK
This section reviews the soundness problems of other works on
static smart contract analysis. We thereby focus on those works
that make soundness claims. We first overview soundness prob-
lems in the reconstruction of smart contracts’ control flow graphs
(which particularly affects the Securify analyzer [48]) and after-
wards successively discuss the issues in the analyses performed
by [48], [37], [24], and [34]. Where possible, we provide repro-
ducible evidence in form of concrete counter-examples for the
spotted sources of unsoundness.
D.1 Control Flow Reconstruction
Most tools that analyze Ethereum smart contracts at the level of
bytecode base their analysis on the contract’s control flow graph
(CFG). However, the design of the EVM bytecode language does not
allow for an easy reconstruction of a contract’s control flow since
jump destinations are not statically fixed, but might be dynamically
computed. More precisely, in EVM bytecode jump destinations are
read from the stack and hence can be subject to prior computations.
Even though the set of potential jump destinations is statically
determined (since only such program counters with a JUMPDEST
instruction constitute valid jump destinations), the concrete desti-
nation of a jump instruction might only be dispatched at runtime.
The challenge hence lies in statically narrowing down the set of
possible jump destinations for each branch instruction (JUMP or
JUMPI). To this end, the state-of-the-art analyzer [48] employs a
custom algorithm, another popular solution [44] uses an external
open-source tool [7] for control flow graph reconstruction. While
correctness for both of them has never been discussed, flaws in
the CFG reconstruction can lead to catastrophic consequences: An
unsound reconstruction that erroneously excludes possible jump
destinations, can deem parts of the contract code unreachable that
carries critical and potentially unsafe functionality (e.g., reentrant
calls).
When reviewing the algorithms used in [48] and [7], we found
soundness issues in both approaches as wewill discuss in the follow-
ing. In Figure 19 we show a compact example of a smart contract’s
control flow that is recovered incorrectly by [7, 48] with no errors
reported. Intuitively, the control flow of this contract should not be
fully recoverable because one of its jump destinations depends on
some blockchain information (the block hash and the block number)
which cannot be statically predicted, but will only be fixed once
the contract has been published on the blockchain.
The smart contract is structured into five basic blocks. The first
block (starting at program counter 0), initializes the local machine
check with two 0 values and continues with the execution of the
second block starting at program counter 7 ( 1 ). The second block
can be entered via a jump (since it starts with a JUMPDEST instruc-
tion). It intuitively takes two stack values as arguments, the first
one functioning as jump offset and the second being the jump con-
dition: it computes the next jump destination as the sum of 20 and
the top stack element and conditionally jumps to this destination
based on the second stack value. In the first iteration since both of
these values are 0 (and so particularly the condition is 0), no jump
is performed, but instead the execution proceeds with block three
(starting at program counter 12) with the empty stack ( 2 ). This
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1 sel preStorageForId: int -> [int*int];
2 sel postStorageForId: int -> [int*int];
3 sel emptyListIfNoPostConditionForId: int -> [bool];
4 sel dummyListIfNoPostConditionForId: int -> [bool];
5
6 rule initOp :=
7 for (!id:int) in ids()
8 clause
9 true
10 => MState {!id, 0}(0, [@V(0)], [@V(0)],
11 for (! offset: int , !value:int) in preStorageForId (!id): x: array <AbsDom > -> store x !offset @V(!value), [@V(0)],
12 false);
13
14 test correctValues expect SAT
15 for (!id: int) in ids(),
16 (!b: bool) in emptyListIfNoPostConditionForId (!id)
17 [?stor: array <AbsDom >, ?i: int]
18 for (! offset: int , !value:int) in postStorageForId (!id): && abseq(select ?stor !offset ,@V(!value)),
19 (for (! offset: int , !value:int) in postStorageForId (!id): || ?i = !offset) ? (true) : (abseq(select ?stor ?i,@V(0))),
20 Halt{!id}(?stor , false);
21
22 test uniqueValues expect UNSAT
23 for (!id: int) in ids(),
24 (!b: bool) in emptyListIfNoPostConditionForId (!id)
25 [?stor: array <AbsDom >]
26 for (! offset: int , !value:int) in postStorageForId (!id): || absneq(select ?stor !offset ,@V(!value)),
27 Halt{!id}(?stor , false);
28
29 test irregularHalt expect UNSAT
30 for (!id: int) in ids(),
31 (!b: bool) in dummyListIfNoPostConditionForId (!id)
32 [?stor: array <AbsDom >]
33 Halt{!id}(?stor , false);
Figure 18: Setup for automated testing.
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Figure 19: Problematic Control Flow Example.
block pushes the current block number and hash to the stack and
jumps back to the second block ( 3 ). Since at this point the input
to the second block are values that are not statically determinable,
it needs to be assumed that the jump condition as well as the jump
offset could have any value. It is hence possible during the real
execution to jump to arbitrary jump destinations from program
counter 10 ( 4 ). This includes the block starting at program counter
20 where the execution of the contract is stopped and most impor-
tantly the block starting at program counter 22 that executes a
reentrant call. Thus, if this jump destination is undiscovered, false
correctness results for reentrancy can be produced in a subsequent
analysis.
There are two sound approaches for handling the usage of un-
predictable information in jump destination reconstruction: Con-
servatively, a smart contract can be rejected by the analysis and
hence be considered potentially vulnerable in this case (which is
our approach) or the analysis could assume that all JUMPDEST
instructions of the contract are potentially reachable. The tools that
we reviewed, however, did not follow any of these options, but pro-
duced the following results: [7] correctly discovers the basic blocks,
but cannot recover jumps to the targets 20 and 22 ( 4 ). The result
of [48] is even more surprising: the algorithm does not manage to
recover any of the blocks shown in Figure 19, but reports as CFG
of this contract a single block consisting of a modulo instruction
followed by the STOP opcode. Consequently, all analyses that use
either of these CFG reconstruction solutions will consider the reen-
trant call of the example contract to be unreachable and will based
on that label the contract as safe to reentrancy attacks.
D.2 Securify
The Securify tool [48] encodes dependencies inferred from a con-
tract’s control flow graph as logical facts and specifies security
properties in terms of compliance and violation patterns using
these facts. It is claimed that the satisfaction of a compliance pat-
tern is sufficient for proving a security property, while matching
a violation pattern guarantees that a security property is indeed
violated. We will in the following review most of the provided
patterns and give counterexamples, showing that most of these
patterns indeed are not sound. We validated as far as possible
the patterns reported in the paper with the provided online tool
(https://securify.chainsecurity.com)15 . Unfortunately, some of the
15We accessed the website January 19th and validated all properties with Solidity
Compiler version 0.4.25.
30
eThor : Practical and Provably Sound Static Analysis
of Ethereum Smart Contracts Accepted for ACM CCS, 2020
patterns introduced in [48] were changed or renamed in the online
tool. We will note this when discussing the corresponding pattern.
Also it should be noted that the online tool only reports security
problems. More precisely, an alarm (red) is produced, if a violation
pattern is matched, a warning (orange) is produced if neither a vio-
lation nor a compliance pattern is matched. The lack of a report for
a certain security property indicates that the property’s compliance
pattern was matched.
Ether Liquidity. The LQ (Ether liquidity) property ensures that a
property cannot lock Ether (for this reason it is called Locked Ether
in the online tool) meaning that for all the contract’s executions
either leave the contract’s balance unaffected or there is a trace that
allows to reduce the contract’s balance.
The property formulates three different compliance patterns. The
first two compliance patterns ensure that all halting instructions are
preceded by a successful conditional check on the value given to the
call being 0. This ensures that only such executions can complete
successfully that have been guaranteed to have gotten no money
transferred. These patterns are probably sufficient to guarantee
that a contract can never receive money and hence for showing the
LQ property. The third compliance pattern checks whether there
is a call that is reachable while at the same time (meaning that
the call and an exception opcode are not reachable from the same
conditional branch) no exception is reachable and this call transfers
non-zero value or a value that is settable by the environment. This
shall ensure that the contract has at least one way of successfully
transferring money.
This compliance pattern is not sufficient for ensuring Ether Liq-
uidity. Despite the problem that the corresponding Ether transfer-
ring call could be restricted to a certain address which can never
initiate such a call (as it belongs to a contract without a function-
ality to call other contracts), the pattern also does not consider
that an exception that reverts the transaction might not only occur
conditionally.
Consider the following contract:
1 contract Bob {
2 function sendMoney(address c) {
3 c.send (2);
4 throw;
5 }
6 function receive () payable {
7 }
8 }
This contract is labeled not to lock Ether even though it can
receive money (via the receive function) and every Ether transfer
to another contract (via sendMoney) will be reverted. Note that the
absence of Solidity’s payable will be translated to a conditional check
on the call value, and cause a revert once if the value given to the
call is non-zero.
The violation pattern for LQ requires that there is no CALL instruc-
tion that transfers a non-zero amount of Ether and that there is
some halting instruction such that if its reachability is dependent
on a conditional branching, this condition can be determined by the
transaction data, hence can be enabled by the transaction initiator.
This shall ensure that there is at least one execution trace that does
not halt exceptionally and hence reverts the execution effect.
However, the following contract is reported to lock Ether
(matches the violation pattern):
1 contract Bob {
2 function receive(uint x) payable {
3 if (x > 0 || x <= 0) {
4 throw;
5 }
6 }
7 }
This contract clearly cannot lock Ether since it cannot receive
any Ether. Its only function receive throws an exception depending
on a conditional which is always true. Still, the dependency analysis
labels this condition to be determined by transaction data, so that
the pattern is matched. This can be also considered as a soundness
flaw in the Securify’s definition of determinability since in this
case clearly for different values of transaction data the value of
the condition is the same (which contradicts [48]’s definition of
determinability.)
Nowrites after calls. The NW (Nowrites after calls) property says
that a contract’s storage when terminating the execution should
always be the same as at the point of a previous contract call (so
the contract shall not be altered between a CALL instruction and
the contract’s successful termination). The online tool does not
implement a property with such a name, but instead implements
similar patterns for a property called Gas-dependent Reentrancy.
This property uses the same intuition, but puts an additional require-
ment that the amount of gas given to the call shall be dependent
of the remaining gas. One should note that it is very misleading
that this property is in the online tool called Gas-dependent Reen-
trancy, even though [48] explicitly claims that the NW property
is different from reentrancy. We will detail out later why the NW
property indeed is not a sound or complete approximation of the
single-entrancy property.
The corresponding compliance pattern requires that the CALL
instruction may not be followed by an SSTORE instruction. This
pattern however does not consider that there are other ways of
modifying the storage than the SSTORE instruction, e.g., by us-
ing DELEGATECALL for calling a library function that alters the
storage.
Consider the following example:
1 library Lib {
2 struct Data { bool bvalue; }
3 function write(Data storage self , bool value) {
4 self.bvalue = value;
5 }
6 }
7
8 contract Bob {
9 Lib.Data sent;
10
11 constructor () {
12 sent.bvalue = false;
13 }
14
15 function ping(address c) {
16 if (!( sent.bvalue)) {
17 if (!c.call.value (2)()) {
18 throw;
19 }
20 Lib.write(sent , true);
21 }
22 }
23 }
This example clearly matches the compliance pattern (since the
call to the library will be translated to a DELEGATECALL instruc-
tion, hence no SSTORE instruction appears in the first place). This
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can also be verified with the online tool which does not report a
violation of the Gas Dependent Reentrancy property.
The violation pattern for the NW property requires that there
is a CALL that must be proceeded by an SSTORE instruction. This
pattern is also not sufficient as illustrated by the following example:
1 contract Alice {
2 bool sent = false;
3
4 function ping(address c) {
5 if (!sent) {
6 sent = true;
7 c.call.value (2)();
8 sent = sent;
9 }
10 }
11 }
This contract clearly does not violate the property (since the con-
tract storage at the point of terminating is not altered as compared
to the point of calling). Still it matches the violation pattern (and
is reported by the online tool) indicating a guaranteed property
violation.
Next, we shortly discuss why the NW property (independently
of the fact that the patterns are not sufficient) is neither sound nor
complete for single-entrancy.
We will first give an example of a contract satisfying the NW
property while still being reentrant.
1 contract Bank {
2 address a; address b;
3 uint balA; uint balB;
4
5 function setBalA (uint v) {
6 balA = v;
7 }
8
9 function drainA(address ben) {
10 if (msg.sender != a) { throw; }
11 if (balA > 0) {
12 uint v = balA;
13 setBalA (0);
14 ben.call.value(v)();
15 }
16 }
17 }
This contract implementing a simple bank functionality for two
parties (identified by their addresses a and b) is vulnerable to a reen-
trancy attack even though no writes after the call are performed.
Similar to the initial example in Figure 2, given that a is the address
of a malicious contract, this contract can use the public setBalA func-
tion in a reentering execution to disable the guard (here balA) before
reentering the contract’s drainA function to retransfer money that a
does not own.
For an example of a contract that does not satisfy the NW prop-
erty, but that is still safe, we give a contract with a simple locking
functionality (similar to the example in Figure 2).
1 contract Bank {
2 uint lock;
3 mapping (address => uint) bal;
4
5 function drain(address a) {
6 if (lock == 1) { throw; }
7 lock = 1;
8 a.call.value(bal[msg.sender ])();
9 bal[msg.sender] = 0;
10 lock = 0;
11 }
12 }
The locking ensures that whenever the function is reentered
an exception occurs and hence no further call can be performed.
Still since the lock needs to be released at the end of the execution,
clearly the NW property is violated.
Restricted write. The RW (restricted write) property requires that
all write accesses are restricted, meaning there is at least one address
that when initiating the call cannot reach the corresponding write
access.
This property needs to be questioned in its semantic definition
in that this definition explicitly requires that SSTORE instructions
are not reachable even though (as discussed before), the SSTORE
instruction is not the only way of manipulating storage.
So for example when analyzing the following contract, there
is no RW violation or warning produced for the Bob contract even
though the ping functions allows to set contract’s data filed containing
the owner to be set to an arbitrary value by anyone.
1 library Lib {
2 struct Data { address owner; }
3 function write(Data storage self , address value) {
4 self.owner = value;
5 }
6 }
7
8 contract Bob {
9 Lib.Data data;
10
11 function ping(address c) {
12 Lib.write(data , c);
13 }
14 }
The given compliance pattern requires that the storage offset
specified in a SSTORE instruction needs to be determined by the
caller of the contract. This pattern might indeed be sufficient for
the semantic property only considering SSTORE instructions.
The violation pattern requires that the reachability of SSTORE
instructions as well as the offset given to them may not depend on
the caller of the contract.
However, in the following contract an unrestricted write is de-
tected:
1 contract Test {
2 bool test = false;
3
4 function flipper () {
5 if (msg.sender != 0)
6 flip();
7 }
8 function flip () internal {
9 test = !test;
10 }
11 }
This contract should be safe with respect to the semantic def-
inition since flip, the only function containing a write access is
an internal function, meaning that it can only be invoked within
the contract. Given that the only place where it is invoked (in the
flipper function), it is done with a restriction on the caller (msg.sender),
also this storage access is restricted. However, the contract is re-
ported to match the violation pattern. A reason for that could be
an unsoundness in the underlying dependency analysis.
Restricted transfer. The RT (restricted transfer property) excludes
that Ether transfers (via CALL) cannot be invoked by any user.
Again one could criticize that the property does not consider other
ways of transferring money (e.g., by CALLCODE). The following
contract, for example, is considered safe by this definition:
1 contract Bob {
2 function sendMoney(address c) {
3 c.callcode.value (5)();
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4 }
5 }
The corresponding compliance pattern requires that all calls
transfer 0 Ether. Given that the property only considers CALL in-
structions, this pattern is probably sufficient.
There are two violation patterns for the RT property, the first one
requires that there is a CALL instruction transferring a non-zero
amount and whose reachability may be dependent on the caller. We
can give a counterexample similar to the one for the RW violation
pattern:
1 contract Test {
2 function sendMoney () {
3 if (msg.sender != 1)
4 sendM();
5 }
6 function sendM () internal {
7 msg.sender.send (1);
8 }
9 }
Again, the tool does not detect that effectively themoney transfer
is restricted since the internal function sendM can only be invoked in
a restricted fashion.
The second violation pattern for the RT property requires instead
of the transferred value to be non-zero, that the value is determined
by the input to the call while at the same point the input might not
affect the reachability of the CALL instruction.
We can again give a simple counterexample similar to the previ-
ous one:
1 contract Test {
2 function sendMoney(uint x) {
3 if (msg.sender != 1)
4 sendM(x);
5 }
6 function sendM (uint y) internal {
7 msg.sender.send(y);
8 }
9 }
This example is detected as insecure while having only restricted
money transfers.
Handled exception. The HE property (Handled exception) is not
semantically defined, but intuitively shall ensure that exceptions
that occurred in function calls shall be handled. Due to the lack of
a formal definition, it is hard to argue to which extend the given
patterns really are sufficient, but we give here examples of prop-
er/problematic exception handling which are wrongly classified.
The compliance pattern requires that every call must be followed
by some branching instruction whose condition is determined by
the call’s return value. Clearly, the following contract is matched
by this pattern even though it does not perform a proper exception
handling.
1 contract SimpleBank {
2 mapping(address => uint) balances;
3 uint successes;
4
5 function withdraw () {
6 bool success = msg.sender.send(balances[msg.sender ]);
7 if (success) { successes ++; }
8 balances[msg.sender] = 0;
9 }
10 }
Even though this contract branches on the return value of the call,
this branching does not influence the critical instruction, namely
the following storage update that assumes a successful call.
The violation pattern for HE requires that all branching instruc-
tions following a CALL instruction do not have a condition that
depends on the outcome of the call. We give an example of a con-
tract matching this pattern that however implements a useful form
of exception handling:
1 library Lib {
2 function toInt(bool b) returns (uint n) {
3 if (b)
4 return 1;
5 else
6 return 0;
7 }
8 }
9
10 contract SimpleBank {
11 mapping(address => uint) balances;
12
13 function withdraw () {
14 bool success = msg.sender.send(balances[msg.sender ]);
15 balances[msg.sender] = Lib.toInt(success) * balances[msg.
sender ];
16 }
17 }
This contract uses the return value of the call to update the
callee’s balance after the call depending on that. Since the branching
on the return value is outsourced to the library function toInt, it can
not be captured by the corresponding pattern.
In general, it is hard to imagine how proper exception handling
should be generically defined, since this is a propertywhich depends
in the end on the contract’s desired functionality.
Transaction ordering dependency. The TOD (Transaction or-
dering dependency) property is again not formally defined, but
requires that the order of other transactions shall not influence the
calls of the contract. More precisely, calls shall not depend on state
that can be altered by other transactions. The paper says that actu-
ally different types of dependency will be considered distinguishing
whether the amount to be transferred (TA), the receiver (TR) or
the reachability of the CALL as a whole are affected (TT). However,
it seems that TT is not implemented since not even the following
straight forward TT violating contract is detected by the online
tool:
1 contract SimpleGame {
2 uint counter = 0;
3
4 function play() {
5 counter = 10;
6 }
7
8 function getReward () {
9 if (counter > 0) {
10 msg.sender.send (10);
11 }
12 }
13 }
The compliance pattern for TOD requires that calls shall not
depend on the contract’s storage or balance. Again this property
does not consider that there are different ways of calling, e.g., using
CALLCODE.
The following contract is considered secure:
1 contract Bob {
2 uint price;
3
4 function setPrice(uint v) {
5 price = v;
6 }
7
8 function sendMoney(address c) {
9 c.callcode.value(price)();
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10 }
11 }
This contract transfers an amount of money (price) that it reads
from the storage and that could have been modified by another
transaction before. Still, no warning about a TOD violation is trig-
gered by the online tool.
The violation pattern requires that there is a CALL which de-
pends on a read of a constant storage cell that can be written.
Consider the following example contract:
1 contract Bob {
2 uint price = 5;
3
4 function sendMoney(address c) {
5 price = price;
6 c.send(price);
7 }
8 }
This contract is labeled to be TOD even though the transferred
amount is constantly 5 and cannot be influenced by any other
transaction.
Validated arguments. The VA (Validated arguments) property is
again not semantically specified, but shall ensure that arguments to
a function are checked for meeting desired preconditions. Similarly
to the HE property, it is unclear how such a goal should be captured
by a generic property.
The compliance pattern requires that such values that depend
on input value may only be written to the global storage if they
have previously been checked, meaning that must have been a
conditional branching before whose condition depended on the
argument.
The following contract is an easy example of a contract matching
the compliance pattern while not performing proper argument
validation:
1 contract Test {
2 uint test;
3 uint count = 0;
4
5 function setTest (uint x) {
6 if (x < 10) {
7 count ++;
8 }
9 test = x;
10 }
11 }
Even though the write to storage of argument variable x is pre-
ceded by a corresponding conditional branch, this check does not
influence whether the variable is indeed written to storage.
The violation pattern for VA requires that there is a storage
instruction writing a value dependent on an argument that is not
preceded by a corresponding conditional branch with a condition
dependent on the argument.
The following contract performs a proper argument validation,
but is still matched by the violation pattern.
1 library Lib {
2 function validateArgument(uint i) {
3 if (!(i >= 0 && i < 100))
4 throw;
5 }
6 }
7
8 contract Test {
9 uint test;
10
11 function setTest (uint x) {
12 Lib.validateArgument(x);
13 test = x;
14 }
15 }
Since the validation is performed by the library function
validateArgument, the conditional branch which performs the validation
cannot be detected.
D.3 NeuCheck
The tool NeuCheck[37] analyses Ethereum Smart contracts written
in the Solidity by checking the contract’s syntax graph for specific
patterns. The tool is claimed to be sound even though no concrete
soundness claim is formulated.
The formulated patterns are purely syntactic and can be rather
seen as a check for the compliance with certain style guidelines.
Take as an example the access control pattern: this pattern checks
whether all functions have modifiers such as private or internal de-
fined which restrict general access. It is unclear which semantic
property should be implied by this pattern, and clearly there are
safe usages of public functions as well as incorrect access control
(e.g., due to a wrong party being allowed to call a certain contract
function) even though a contract function is restricted by some
modifier.
For illustrating the issues of this syntactic pattern-based ap-
proach further, we will in the following review the reentrancy
pattern as this is particularly interesting for our case: The reen-
trancy pattern checks for the occurrences of Solidity’s call function
that does not have a gas limit checks and checks whether this oc-
currence is followed by the assignment of a state variable. First, the
absence of checking a gas limit does not ensure that reentrancy
attacks are not possible. If not gas limit is set, the gas given to the
call is computed with respect to the remaining gas. So one could
easily set a high gas limit or even set all remaining gas of the exe-
cution as a gas limit (if the amount specified exceeds the remaining
gas, the same gas as in the case of a lacking specification is given to
the call). On top of this, as discussed for Securify, setting a variable
assignment is not the only way of changing the state (this can also
be done via a library call). The counterexample for Securify’s NW
compliance pattern would also be a valid counterexample for this
case. Similarly, the Securify’s NW violation pattern would serve as
a counterexample for the patterns completeness. As a consequence,
matching the reentrancy pattern clearly does not guarantee the
absence of a reentrancy attack.
Unfortunately, we could not experimentally assess the unsound-
ness of the provided patterns, since we did not find a way to build
the tool from the provided sources16. The assessment of the tool
is further aggravated by the fact that the paper gives the corre-
sponding patterns in PseudoCode that leaves many crucial details
(in particular how the dependency structure between syntactic
constructs is established) undefined.
D.4 EtherTrust
The approach to sound smart contract analysis presented in [24]
exhibits an unsoundness when it comes to modeling reentering
16The sources are made available at https://github.com/Northeastern-University-
Blockchain/NeuCheck. We contacted the authors at the end of November for clarifica-
tion of the building process but received no reply as of January 20th, 2020.
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executions. More precisely, the proposed abstraction assumes that
the contract’s storage at the point of reentering is the same as at
the point of calling. This is not necessarily the case, since another
(malicious) contract might in the meanwhile manipulate the storage
of the corresponding contract by invoking other state-changing
functions of it. An example is the Bank contract depicted in Figure 2.
This contract would be deemed secure according to the abstraction
presented in [24] since the described attack requires to change the
value of the contract’s lock variable by an invocation of the release
function prior to reentering the drain function. If it is assumed that
the storage at the point of reentering the drain function is the same
as at the point of invoking the call method, the contract would be
secure since the lock variable is always set to 1 when calling hence
preventing to reach the call method when reentering.
D.5 ZEUS
A recently published work is the analysis tool ZEUS [34] that analy-
ses smart contracts written in Solidity using symbolic model check-
ing. The analysis proceeds by translating Solidity code to an abstract
intermediate language that again is translated to LLVM bitcode.
Finally, existing symbolic model checking tools for LLVM bitcode
are leveraged for performing the analysis. The security properties
are defined in terms of XACML style policies that are translated
to state reachability assertions in the intermediate language (and
finally to assertions in LLVM bitcode). The authors evaluate their
tool for generic security properties (such as reentrancy) which are
however not expressed in terms of policies (which are contract
specific), but by an informal description of how to add specific
assertions to contracts of interest. For some properties, e.g. reen-
trancy, the insertion of assertions is not sufficient and additional
program modifications need to be applied to the original contracts.
The authors claim their tool to be sound which they support by a
proof sketch and empirical results. This claim however has several
shortcomings:
• There is no formal soundness statement made. In particular,
there is no formal relation between the policy compliance of
Solidity contracts and the analysis results established and also
not covered in the proof sketch.
• The proof is sketchy and exhibits several holes and at least
two flaws: While there is an intuitive argument why given
the translation from Solidity to the abstract intermediate lan-
guage are correct and adding assertions does not influence
semantics, there is no proof provided for the statement that the
translation from the intermediate language to LLVM bitcode
preserves soundness. That this property does not hold is (indi-
rectly) admitted by the authors as they discuss that the compiler
optimizations on LLVM bitcode remove relevant contract be-
havior. Consquently, assuming that compiler optimizations on
LLVM bitcode are semantics preserving, this clearly contradicts
that the translation from the intermediate language preserves
semantics. For one particular optimization, a fix is hard coded,
but there is no formal argument given that this particular fix is
sufficient for establishing soundness. Also the claim that the
provided translation from Solidity to the intermediate language
is faithful can be clearly contradicted. This is due to a clear
deviation in the call semantics of the intermediate language
from the Solidity semantics. The mechanism underlying So-
lidity’s call functionalities is the one of the CALL instructions
in EVM bytecode. In particular, this mechanism determines
that the failing of a contract call causes the revocation of the
global state to the point of calling. The proposed semantics of
the intermediate language however does not allow for such a
revocation (even by design). Grishchenko et al. [25] spotted a
similar issue in the semantics used in Oyente [38].
• The final results for the predefined properties (such as reen-
trancy) are not covered by the soundness claim as there is
no (formal) argument made that the performed program mod-
ifications are sound. In particular the presented method for
detecting same-function reentrancies is faulty: For detecting
same-function reentrancy of a function f , f is replicated (re-
sulting in f ′) and the Solidity’s call construct in f is replaced
by a call to f ′ whose occurrence of call is preceded by a false as-
sertion for proving the unreachability of the corresponding call.
This treatment is problematic in several ways: First, the use of
the call construct is not the only way of calling another contract,
indeed it is way more common to use direct calls. Second, simi-
lar to the problem discussed for [24], such an abstraction fails
to detect the example of Figure 2, even though this is clearly
a case of same-function reentrancy. The problem is that for
the used approach of replacing calls by invocations to f ′ it is
assumed that a call can at most be preceded by a direct invoca-
tion of f without any other state changing function calls being
happening in the meanwhile. Consequently, single-entrancy
(and even same-function single-entrancy) is a property that
cannot be assessed by considering certain contract parts in
isolation. Consider the following to contracts:
1 contract Bank{
2 uint lock;
3 mapping (address => uint) bal;
4
5 function take () {
6 lock = 1;
7 }
8
9 function release () {
10 lock = 0;
11 }
12
13 function drain(address a) {
14 if (lock == 1) { throw; }
15 lock = 1;
16 a.call.value(bal[msg.sender ])();
17 bal[msg.sender] = 0;
18 lock = 0;
19 }
20 }
1 contract Bank{
2 uint lock;
3 mapping (address => uint) bal;
4
5 function drain(address a) {
6 if (lock == 1) { throw; }
7 lock = 1;
8 a.call.value(bal[msg.sender ])();
9 bal[msg.sender] = 0;
10 lock = 0;
11 }
12 }
Even though the implementation of the drain function is iden-
tical in both contracts, the first contract allows for a (same-
function) reentrancy attack while the second does not. ZEUS,
however, would label both of these contracts to be safe.
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Unfortunately, we were not able to conduct an empirical evalua-
tion of the described issues since no sources for ZEUS are made
available. Our request to the authors of [34] to provide us with
sources or binaries that would allow us to experimentally access
ZEUS has been denied. For this reason we were forced to conduct
our comparison with ZEUS on the publicly available dataset for
which [34] reports numbers. We further discuss this dataset in the
following.
Problems in the ZEUS dataset.While comparing HoRSt against
the dataset used in [34]17 we encountered several problems. The
dataset is a list of 1524 contracts with the classification provided
by ZEUS and the assessment whether the authors consider this
classification correct. No source or bytecode is provided.
Of these 1524 contracts, 21 have a name that does not resemble a
Ethereum address (e.g. Code_3_fdf6d_faucet). Of the remaining
1503, 397 actually have a truncated address (i.e., 39 instead of 40
hexadecimal digits). The remaining 1106 addresses contain dupli-
cates. After removing them we arrive at 1033 addresses. For 286
of these addresses we were not able to obtain the bytecode: 53
have been self-destructed according to https://etherscan.io which
makes retrieving their bytecode non-trivial, 232 have no recorded
transaction (in particular no transaction that created them) and
1 is an external account (i.e., an address with no code deployed).
This leaves us with 747 addresses. After removing contracts with
the same bytecode we arrive at 720 contracts18. We contacted the
authors of [34] on July 16th 2019 about these problems and received
no answer as of January 20th 2020.
17https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12g-pKsCtp3lUmT2AXngsqkBGSEoE6xNH51e-
ofZa8
18Note that the authors of [34] deduplicated their dataset on the source level, therefore
it may well be that these same bytecodes were produced by different source codes
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